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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The debate over the causes of the path of the price of oil over the twenty-first century has 
failed to address the method of oil pricing. The thesis guiding this dissertation is that the 
crude oil pricing method constrains the influence of financial investors in oil futures via (1) a 
two-part price system, (2) the role of both spot and contract markets, and (3) the connections 
between the futures market and the specific physical market related to the futures contract. 
Market participants construct the pricing method and adjust it through historical time and 
context, similar to methods of pricing found in manufacturing and retail markets. The details 
of the physical oil market, grounded in the pricing method, leads to the application in chapter 
5. The chapter examines the behavior of prices for WTI and Brent-related futures markets as 
well as for one light sweet and one medium sour crude oil at the US Gulf coast. Data 
pertinent to conditions in the physical oil market includes levels and quality of production 
and imports to the US, changing environmental standards, US refining complexity, demand 
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growth and others clearly supports the path of these prices. The following illustrates the 
limits placed on financial investors in determination of the price of oil through the method of 
pricing and the conditions in the physical oil market. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The following seeks to develop an empirically grounded post-Keynesian and 
Institutional theory of commodity pricing, starting with the role of financial investors in oil 
pricing. The work follows the path laid out by Post-Keynesian and Institutionalist scholars 
who have developed an empirically grounded theory of pricing based on institutions of 
market governance, where prices occupy an important position as the means of continuity for 
a business enterprise. This includes analyzing the business enterprise as a going concern.  
Previous heterodox literature on pricing theory focuses mainly on those methods and 
institutions related to industrial or manufacturing and retail prices, while the method of 
commodity pricing remains largely unexamined. Many of the same themes of market 
governance, including administered prices, likely exist in commodity markets, but these 
markets also contain mechanisms and structures unique to commodity prices.  
A heterodox analysis enables identification of systems of market governance, 
including those that diminish the incentive to compete over market share via prices. The 
heterodox foundation requires an examination of pricing, rather than exclusive focus on 
coordination of the market via a naturally given price mechanism that adjusts to equate 
marginal cost and marginal supply.  
The debate surrounding the spike and collapse in oil prices involved whether 
“fictitious” demand for commodities from financial investors ruined the accuracy of the 
2 
 
pricing mechanism. The assumption was, in the absence of financial investors becoming 
active in futures markets, the price would adjust to where the fundamentals of supply and 
demand meet.  
This dissertation contributes to this pricing debate within the heterodox viewpoint by 
outlining the limits to financial investors imposed through the structures and mechanisms 
related to physical oil pricing.  
 The following chapters engage in disciplines, in addition to economics, by analyzing 
markets as social institutions. Producers and other interested market participants, acting 
through associations and other existing institutions, create, shape and adjust market structures 
and mechanisms. Vested interests establish, shape and adjust the pricing method through 
time, as changing circumstances warrant.  
The pricing method is reflective of the market structure, the power of the various 
market players as well as the historical context within which the market exists. A pricing 
method is developed and adjusted within an historical context – within cultural norms, 
institutions and industry structure – and industry participants amend the pricing mechanisms 
and even the pricing method through time as required or enabled through changing 
circumstances. This evolutionary philosophical perspective guides the research through the 
various disciplines.  
An additional aspect of interdisciplinary studies arises in the breadth of the 
examination into the potential causes of the latest oil price cycle. The context of the oil 
market highlights many potential ‘fundamental’ causes for the run-up in oil prices from the 
early 2000s to 2008, as well as the eventual declines. Researching these possibilities, 
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involves understanding some aspects of refining and petroleum product specifications, 
including Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, as well as political science 
and policy in understanding the passage of renewable fuel standards and the ban – and 
eventual repeal – on crude oil exports.  
Developing an understanding of the context of the oil market also entails moving 
outside of scholarly journals to areas such as niche and business journalism, analyst and 
financial publications as well as government publications, legislation and industry comments 
on proposed legislation. 
 Delving into the formation of the method of pricing and the implications thereof 
requires moving beyond economics. A purely economics-based approach can assume the 
method of pricing and motives of the market players, and in the extreme, can limit the 
question and analysis to correlations between the activities of financial players and the price 
of oil futures contracts. 
The oil market stands out as a starting point for understanding the role of financial 
investors within a commodity pricing method. The cost of crude oil is included in the price of 
many other commodities. Crude oil is a storable commodity, making institutions of price 
stability for oil more complex than those related to perishable commodities. Some form of 
hydrocarbon is an input in the production and transportation of nearly all goods. Lastly, the 
price of oil drew much attention in the discussion over the financialization of commodity 
prices and the debate over whether financial investors were driving commodity prices in the 
twenty-first century 
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Oil Pricing—basic concepts 
 
The price of physical oil actually consists of two prices. Typically, the overwhelming 
majority of the price is a reference price. West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent and Dubai-
Oman are the three markets from which reference prices derive. While each of these is a 
physical crude oil(s), there are multiple markets, or prices, constructed around each of the 
physical crude streams, and the various markets serve different purposes and potentially 
contain varying participants. Each of the reference crude streams has a futures contract 
associated with the physical crude. The debate over the role of financial investors in the oil 
price cycle of the twenty-first century revolved almost entirely around the futures market 
price for one or two of these crude streams (WTI and Brent). 
The second part of the price of physical oil is the differential. The differential shows 
the price of a specific crude oil at a specific location, relative to the reference price. The 
differential represents the crude quality and local conditions relative to the reference price 
quality and location. The differential for a particular crude oil tends to reflect granular details 
of a specific location, such as area infrastructure or demand conditions in the typical 
destination market. The portion of the differential related to quality is not constant, but rather 
moves with demand conditions in an area – area conditions for locally consumed grades of 
crude oil – or those in destination markets. 
In addition to the price of physical oil consisting of two values, exchanges of physical 
oil take place in different types of markets. Physical crude oil is exchanged though spot 
markets and contracts markets. The value of both the reference and the differential varies 
from spot to contract markets.   
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Spot market transactions are a one-time exchange of physical crude oil, where neither 
party is obliged to exchange further volumes of crude beyond the one agreed-upon 
transaction. In contract markets, parties are obliged to buy/sell physical crude volumes 
regularly over the period of the contract.  
 The following details the physical market surrounding financial oil benchmarks, lays 
out the literature for and against “speculation” as a driver of the price of oil and conveys the 
physical context of the oil market during the period of increased financial participation in 
commodity futures. Finally, a close examination of physical markets at the US Gulf coast 
illuminates the role of the differential and the importance of the method of pricing as a check 
to the role of purely financial players.  
An examination of oil pricing and the movement of the basis and differentials since 
2000 shows that physical players and physical oil market issues are a driving factor in 
determination of the price of physical oil and prices in the futures market. 
 
 
The Speculation versus Fundamentals Debate 
The and Pricing in the Physical Oil Market 
 
Just after the turn of the century, commodity prices diverted from their former long-
run trend, rising and falling within wide ranges not previously seen. After the first rise and 
fall, a new range was established within which prices tended. More recently, prices have 
declined once again. Some stylized facts led researchers to examine the role of financial 
flows and market fundamentals in an attempt to understand the cause of the first run up, 
collapse and newly established range. 
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By 2003, financial investors became interested in commodity markets. This later 
translated into their increasing participation in commodities futures. Through the commodity 
price spike, concerns increased over the consequences of financial investments in commodity 
futures. 
If financial interest overwhelms the traditional future markets participants, it is 
possible financial interests could dictate the price of the futures contract as opposed to 
traditional futures markets participants engaging in price discovery. Concerns over growing 
financial investments point to an apparent fundamental grounding of the price of oil in the 
long term prior to commodities futures becoming increasingly popular as a financial 
investment.  
Putting aside financial markets, the physical oil market was becoming increasingly 
tight as demand was strong and growing while excess capacity was shrinking. The relatively 
low prices of the 1980s and 1990s discouraged investment in production and refining. 
Moreover, the refining industry was designed to handle to higher quality crude oil – less 
dense, with lower sulfur content – while the demand for oil products was moving more to 
lighter product as demand for heavier fuels. Environmental regulations through the first 
decade of the twenty-first century consistently reduced the allowable level of emissions and 
sulfur from petroleum products, further enhancing the value of higher quality, light crude oil. 
Academics, policy analysts, government bodies and other institutions have published 
extensive literature over the last several years in an attempt to understand the effect of 
financial flows on the price of crude oil. After a careful review of the existing literature, it is 
clear the question remains unanswered.  
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Much of the existing literature investigating speculation within the oil market 
revolves around assessing the correlation between the financial flows in futures markets and 
the price of crude oil. The type of model, corrections to the model, the variables chosen, 
including what represents both speculator flows and the price of oil, all influence the results 
obtained. Much of the discussion lacks acknowledgement of the pricing method and an 
emphasis on the historical context. 
 A one-to-one change in the price of physical oil via futures prices is not evident when 
viewed within the broader context of the pricing method. The path of the futures price has 
changed dramatically from its origin in the 1980s. Growing financial interest likely did 
change the way the price of futures contracts behave. How the change in the path of the 
futures price translates to the physical market is dependent on oil pricing. Moreover, market 
participants respond to changes in the behavior of futures markets in multiple ways, 
including adjusting the pricing method, such that a one-to-one connection fails. For instance, 
OPEC producers Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq changed their reference price for imports to 
the US in response to the failure of WTI to represent conditions at the coastal points of entry.  
 It is to the above referenced literature that the discussion now turns. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Introduction 
Minimal consensus exists concerning which variables and methods researchers 
should use when attempting to understand what has driven oil prices since the turn of the 
century. In addition to data and statistical methods, some have pointed out that most of the 
research fails to account for basic structural details of the oil industry.  
The literature review is in three broad sections. The first section consists mostly of 
research seeking to identify whether a correlation exists between financial flows and the 
futures prices of WTI. Open interest in futures contracts and prices of oil futures contracts are 
common data examined in the first section.  
The second part opens the discussion to include the basic context of the physical oil 
market, while still addressing financial factors as possible sources of volatility. Some of the 
literature explicitly acknowledges and works within the reference-pricing framework, present 
in the industry while examining the role of financial investors.  
The third section focuses on research involving relationships between multiple prices, 
including petroleum products and/or oil prices. Some of the third section includes data on 
financial investors, while other authors focus exclusively on price relationships in energy 
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markets. This third section finds energy prices tend to be nonstationary and cointegrated. The 
literature assesses these relationships using error-correction models.   
The review concludes with research by industry-related institutions, which typically 
publish data on the industry itself. Included in this final section are the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA).  Both the EIA and the IEA 
address financial investment in commodity markets, while focusing on more granular details 
of the physical oil market than much of the previously discussed literature. 
 
 
Oil Futures Prices through the 2008  
Spike and Crash 
Passive Investors 
Michael Masters and Adam K. White’s Accidental Hunt Brothers I & II, both 
published in 2008, argue index investing directly caused the run-up and eventual crash in 
commodity prices. Conversely, Stoll and Whaley (2009) argue that index investing did not 
contribute to the rise and crash in commodity prices. While Irwin and Sanders (2012) agree 
with Stoll and Whaley (2010), the former directs their article at rejecting Masters and White 
(2008).  
According to Masters and White (2008a), index investing pushes futures prices higher 
as well as damages the price-discovery function of the futures market. Index investors invest 
in long-only futures contracts, invest for long periods, and are insensitive not only to price 
but also to market fundamentals (10-11).  
Index investors are ignorant of the market conditions of individual commodities and 
so cannot respond to mispricing in the expected manner. Index investors allocate a 
10 
 
percentage of their portfolio to long-only futures contracts
 
thereby failing to provide the 
liquidity of traditional speculators, who engage both sides of the market. The number of 
contracts purchased by index investors depends on the desired diversity, the total size of the 
portfolio, and the weights given to each commodity within the chosen index.  
Investors’ insensitivity to the relationship between price and market fundamentals is 
precisely the reason index investing is harmful for futures markets. Since futures markets 
determine spot prices in physical markets
1
 (Masters and White 2008a), incentives related to 
market fundamentals should drive activity in futures markets.  
The evidence provided by Masters and White (2008a) consists of the correlation 
between the amounts of money flowing into futures contracts for commodities listed on the 
indices and the prices of said futures contracts over the same period.  
Masters and White extrapolated from the public data available for agricultural 
markets published in the CFTC Commitment of Traders Supplemental report on index 
traders. Using the COT supplemental, in combination with the weights published by the two 
major indices, Masters and White calculate the amount of index flows in energy markets 
(Masters and White 2008, 49). 
In addition, according to the authors, there are few reported shortages of physical 
commodities.  
[F]rom 2003 to July 1, 2008 commodity index investment rose by a factor of 25 
times from $13 billion to $317 billion and commodity prices have tripled … It is 
prices, not supply, that has led to food riots around the globe. (Masters and White 
2008a, 14)  
 
                                                 
1
 This is a controversial statement in both its conclusions and transmission mechanism.  
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According to Masters and White, there has been an increase in demand for physical 
commodities, much of which results from the growing Chinese economy. However, index 
investors have equivalently increased the demand for futures contracts (Masters and White 
2008a, 15-18).  
The amount of the increase in demand for physical barrels of oil is equivalent to the 
increase in demand for paper barrels of oil on behalf of index investors. The authors track the 
data and the greater the inflows from index investors, the greater the rise in commodity 
prices
2
 (20-22).  
Index investors have come to dominate the futures market: from 2003-2008, index 
investors purchased a greater portion of futures “…contracts than both Physical Hedgers and 
Traditional Speculators combined” (19)3,4.  
In 1998, physical hedgers held more than three long futures contracts for every long 
futures contract held by speculators (33). In 2008, speculators - traditional and index 
investors combined – held more than two long futures contracts for every long futures 
contract held by physical hedgers (33).  
Index investors served as a catalyst to the recent commodity bubble. As the bubble 
began to form, traditional speculators abandoned their previous trading strategies and adapted 
to new drivers of the market – the new set of conditions put into place by index investing. 
                                                 
2
 The actual relationship under examination is between the price of futures contracts and the 
flow of funds in futures markets, for which index investors are responsible.   
3
 These calculations are the source of much criticism. See below.  
4
 Due to the calculation excluding both spread and “non-reported trades,” it overstates the 
portion of index investors, as index investors are not involved in spread trading. While 
Masters and White mention the exclusion, they do not explain the bias involved in the 
exclusion. 
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Index-investor dominance replaced physical-hedger dominance leading traditional 
speculators to disregard market fundamentals.  
At the point that commodities futures markets ‘tip’ into excessive speculative 
territory, Traditional Speculators wake up to the new market reality and abandon the 
‘supply and demand’ camp in favor of the ‘inflation hedge,’ ‘weak dollar,’ 
‘uncorrelated alpha,’ et cetera camp. (33)  
According to Masters and White, traders have adapted their mentality and habits to 
the new situation, such that futures markets can no longer perform the price discovery 
function appropriately. 
According to Masters and White (2008) oil futures markets were too small to absorb 
the substantial and growing inflows of index investors looking to gain exposure to 
commodity markets as a component of a diversified portfolio
5
.  
Prior to the rise in popularity of index investing, market fundamentals drove the 
activities of participants in the futures market for crude oil. The tension between sellers and 
buyers in the physical market, who also trade in futures markets, enabled accurate price-
discovery. 
The role of “traditional” speculators is to provide liquidity to hedgers. Speculators 
take on price risk in an attempt to gain. Prior to the rise of the index investor, the physical 
market grounded the interactions of physical market players and traditional speculators.  
                                                 
5
 According to Masters and White, the bear-equity markets from 2000-2002 initially attracted 
investors. A significant portion of the funds invested in commodity indices results from 
institutional investors, therefore legal changes at the state level to the Prudent Man rule in the 
early 1990s were a pre-requisite for the increased appetite for index investments. Rather than 
examine the asset in isolation, consideration expands to role of an individual asset within the 
entire portfolio. Lastly, the CFTC began exempting financial institutions from position limits 
in the early 1990s, and essentially absolved them of any limit in 1998 (Masters and White 
2008, 40).  
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Index investors transformed the foundation of the price-discovery process by 
overwhelming the negotiations of physical hedgers and traditional speculators. Once physical 
hedgers lost influence in the crude futures market, traditional speculators shied away from 
trading on the characteristics of the physical market and adapted to the new relevant variables 
of price-determination, whatever they may be at the time
6
.  
Irwin and Sanders criticize the method and conclusions of Masters and White in 
multiple publications. Faulty data leads Masters and White to reach incorrect conclusions 
regarding the effect of speculation, according to Irwin and Sanders (2012, 268). 
Irwin and Sanders (2012) use data that was not available in 2008: the CFTC Index 
Investment Data (IID), which includes data specifically on energy markets. In claiming to 
possess superior data, the IID data, Irwin and Sanders conclude the data used by Masters and 
White is now unacceptable.  
The IID data proves the inaccuracy of extrapolations from the COT Supplemental
7
, 
according to Irwin and Sanders. There is virtually no correlation between the IID data and 
                                                 
6
 Traditional speculators stand to lose money if they continue to follow old patterns in a new 
market; moreover, given the emphasis on relative returns, traders who resist adapting to the 
new situation are likely to become unemployed. 
7
 This should have come as no surprise to the researchers, as there are major differences in 
the two data sets. If the primary function of a trader is deemed index investing, all trades are 
classified as index investments on the COT supplemental. Most importantly, the COT 
supplemental covers only netted trades. Conversely, the IID is a better representation of the 
books of swap dealers rather than their actual activity on futures markets. Whereas the COT 
classifies all trades on futures exchanges as index investing when that is deemed the primary 
function of the trader, the IID includes all of the deals made with clients, rather than actual 
trades that made it to the futures market. The IID relates to the amount of funds committed to 
commodity indices whereas the COT relates to the amount of investment in commodity 
indices that actually flows into futures markets. The CFTC originally published IID 
quarterly, and then monthly. The supplemental is published weekly (CFTC Explanatory 
Notes IID). 
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Masters and White’s calculations about the amount of money invested in energy futures. 
Moreover, “the net long IID position in crude oil is negatively correlated with those of 
agricultural commodities from 2007 to 2011” (Irwin and Sanders 2012, 268). Since Masters 
and White extrapolated from agricultural numbers in the COT supplemental, the analysis is 
invalid. 
Despite Irwin and Sanders conclusion, the lack of correlation between the two data 
sets expected from the definitions of the data. The COT classifies all trades on futures 
exchanges as index investing when that is deemed the primary function of the trader.  
Conversely, the IID includes all of the deals made with clients, rather than actual 
trades on the futures market. The IID relates to the amount of funds committed to commodity 
indices on behalf of a dealer’s clients, whereas the COT relates to the amount of investment 
in commodity indices that flows into futures markets, albeit for agricultural commodities 
(CFTC IID explanatory notes). 
  According to Irwin and Sanders (2012) there are only three possible ways for index 
investors to affect the futures market, all of which cause contemporaneous correlation 
between “index fund position and price changes” (257)8. The first way occurs if futures 
markets are not liquid enough to handle the inflow of index positions, and as index positions 
enter and exit, prices in futures markets should adjust accordingly. The second way index 
funds may affect the futures market is to interfere with the flow of funds by informed traders, 
                                                 
8
 1. Futures markets are not liquid enough to handle the inflow of index positions and as the 
enter and exit, prices in futures markets should adjust accordingly; 2. Index funds interfere 
with the flow of funds by informed traders and may push prices above or below 
fundamentals; 3. The “noise” created by the flows of index funds leads other traders to adjust 
their viewpoints and, thereafter, their trading positions (Irwin and Sanders 2012, 257). 
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thereby moving prices above or below fundamentals. Lastly, the “noise” created by index 
flows may lead other traders to adjust their viewpoints and, thereafter, their trading positions 
(Irwin and Sanders 2012, 257). 
After conducting several regressions using the IID data, Irwin and Sanders conclude 
that index investments were not a statistically significant cause of price changes in energy 
futures markets (2012, 269). Because contemporaneous correlation is lacking, index 
investment is not driving futures prices.  
Moreover, traders did not identify index funds as a reason to adjust perceptions about 
market fundamentals and index funds did not cause prices to diverge from that which is 
justified by the fundamentals.  
According to the several regression results of Stoll and Whaley (2010), index 
investors are unlikely to cause changes in the price of commodities futures although 
speculators may (Stoll and Whaley 2010, 47, 65-66). The net flows of speculators
9
 are 
correlated with futures returns for all 12 commodities examined.  
In contrast to speculator flows, the results of Stoll and Whaley imply a lack of 
causation regarding the net flows of passive investors and the prices of commodities. 
Additionally, they find correlation among commodity prices, regardless of whether they are 
included in popular indices. According to Stoll and Whaley, this suggests fundamentals are 
driving both analytical groups – the prices of both commodities included and excluded from 
popular indices.  
                                                 
9
 Speculators are ‘active’ financial investors as opposed to ‘passive’ index investors. 
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Researchers at the CFTC have examined the role of new investors on the performance 
of futures markets in a number of articles. The CFTC staff report, “Commodity swap dealers 
and index traders with commission recommendations” (2008), concludes that index traders 
were likely a stabilizing force in the run-up in oil prices from December 2007 to June 2008.  
The price of oil continued to rise while the number of contracts held by index 
investors declined. Moreover, much of the interest in index activity fails to show up in the 
futures market as demand for futures contracts, because of internal hedging
10
 by swaps 
dealers.  
During “normal” times, index investors are beneficial to large swings in the price of 
oil. When prices rise substantially relative to other commodities, index investors sell oil 
contracts in order to rebalance their holdings of commodities generally (Verleger 2009, 9-
10). 
Beyond Index Investing 
 “Price dynamics, price discovery and large futures trader interactions in the energy 
complex” (2005) and “Price volatility, liquidity provision and the role of managed money 
traders in energy futures markets” (2005) focus on the role of an active group, labeled 
managed money traders (MMT) by the CFTC.  
The researchers conclude that rather than cause changes in the prices of futures 
contracts, large financial traders respond to the trades of physical hedgers. Commercial 
hedgers respond to changes in the prices of futures contracts. Additionally, the CFTC 
                                                 
10
 A swap dealer need only hedge net exposure to risk. In exchanging exposure with multiple 
parties, a transaction with one party will offset the risk exposure of a transaction with another 
partner.  
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research finds a negative correlation between the trades of MMTs and the price of crude oil 
futures contracts.  
The CFTC publication, "Fundamentals, trader activity and derivatives pricing" 
examines growing financial flows into the market for crude oil and the shape of the futures 
curve (Büyükşahin, et al 2008). Prior to 2002, the short-term price of oil futures varied but 
the long-term price remained stable. Even when the price was volatile in the short term, the 
price one or two years out remained anchored–implying participants believed in the existence 
of market feedbacks in the long term (Büyükşahin, et al 2008; Fattouh 2010). In 2002, near 
futures prices cointegrated with one-year-out futures prices. In 2004, the same cointegration 
occurred between near and two-year-out futures contracts. 
The 2008 CFTC study utilized non-public data and thereby was able to connect the 
change to increased participation of financial traders at the far end of the curve. Hedge funds 
and other financial traders conducted an increasing number of trades at farther out on the 
futures curve. The CFTC paper associates the shift with oil market fundamentals as well as 
financial traders.   
The conclusions of publications in 2009 (Harris et al) and 2010 (Brunetti
 
et al) are 
consistent with previous CFTC research. Speculators do not cause changes in the price of 
crude oil, and speculator flows help reduce volatility in the price of crude oil. 
The following research helps illuminate some aspects of the futures price. 
King et al (2012) analyze the role of multiple groups of non-commercial traders, as 
defined by the CFTC, on the price of oil with a VEC or VAR model where appropriate. The 
period of analysis is broken into four segments, as defined by the behavior of prices therein: 
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June 13, 2006 – June 19, 2007 (stability); June 19, 2007 – July 15, 2008 (increasing); July 
15, 2008 – February 17, 2009 (downturn); and February 17, 2009 – October 31 2009 
(recovery). Variables included in the model are the price of the front-month WTI contract 
and the net positions of each group: Producer-Merchants (PM), Money Managers (MM) and 
Swap Dealers (SD).  
 During the stable period, PM and oil price Granger cause each other and are 
negatively related. Deviations from the long run equilibrium between PM and oil price 
Granger cause SD (negative). In the short run, MM Granger causes PM and PM Granger 
causes SD (positive). Non-linear tests revealed Granger causality from SD to “the oil price at 
the second lag” (positive) (King et al 2012, 40). 
 In the run-up period, oil price and PM Granger cause each other. In contrast to the 
stable period, the relationship is positive. Deviations from the long run equilibrium Granger 
caused MM but not SD. Whether the relationship is positive depends on the source of the 
deviation. The relationship is negative in the case of oil price deviations and positive when 
the deviation results from the PM net position variable.  
 During the downturn, no significant relationships were established.  
In the recovery phase of oil prices, there is no identifiable relationship between PM 
and the oil price directly. Instead, SD Granger caused the oil price (positive). In the short run, 
SD and MM Granger caused the oil price and the oil price Granger caused both SD and MM. 
Additionally in the short run, both SD and PM Granger caused MM.  
 Interestingly, the only long-term relationship between financial traders and the oil 
price appears in the recovery period rather than the run-up or downturn period.  
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Lonnie Stevens and David Sessions (2008) find that the end of the futures curve 
under examination will change the results. Through regression analysis, they claim supply 
conditions dominate the near end of the futures curve, while speculative activity dominates 
the far end.  
In addition to Stevens and Sessions (2008), other academics have begun to parse the 
term structure of the futures curve in an attempt to ascertain causes of recent breaks with 
historical trend.  
In, “No theory? No evidence? No problem! The CFTC has no sound justification for 
its proposed energy speculative position limits” (2010) Craig Pirrong slams the CFTC for 
imposing speculative position limits. He concludes a positive correlation between financial 
funds and the price of crude futures is insufficient justification for imposing position limits.  
The CFTC risks harming the functions of the futures market without any proven 
benefit, according to Pirrong (2010). The CFTC failed to connect activity in the futures 
market to prices in the physical oil market. Speculators participate in financial markets rather 
than physical markets.  
Financial investors sell futures contracts prior to taking delivery of physical crude oil. 
If speculators stockpiled physical crude, prices and inventory levels would move together, 
but they have not, according to Pirrong (2010). There is no demonstrable connection between 
speculators buying in futures markets and the physical price of oil.  
Several researchers have pointed out some of the market tightness and the increase in 
financial flows into energy futures markets and have concluded that fundamentals drove 
prices, but financial flows exacerbated what would have been a smaller absolute increase.  
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Acharya, et al., (2010) show that market fundamentals were largely responsible for 
rising energy prices by utilizing NYMEX futures prices, CFTC total open interest and EIA 
data on US petroleum product inventories – aggregated – in a regression analysis. Although 
they admit financialization of commodities may have played a role in rising prices, they 
conclude speculation likely decreased volatility.  
In 2009, E. James, through regression analysis based on a model of convenience yield 
– imputed through the price of futures contracts at various dates of expiration – claims to 
show the rise in the price of oil up to $100 was a result of market fundamentals, while the 
rise from $100 to $140 was a result of speculative activity. The subsequent crash in the price 
of crude oil was temporary and a result of collapsing demand. Upon the expected recovery in 
demand, the price of crude oil will rise, once again.  
Both a Government Accountability report in 2007 and Behr (2009) of the Global 
Public Policy Institute conclude that both speculation and market fundamentals likely 
contributed to the rise in commodity prices, but the debate will continue to remain unsettled 
until sufficient data exists.  
Christopher Gilbert concludes, for commodities generally, fundamentals explain the 
price movements although index fund activity likely amplified the process. James Hamilton 
(2005; 2009a; 2009b) comes to a similar conclusion, finding evidence in supply and demand 
fundamentals. Although he believes market fundamentals led to a speculative bubble, owing 
to the elasticity of supply and demand.  
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Kahn 2009, Kaufmann 2011, and Kaufmann and Ullman 2009 and Saporta, et al 2009 
find evidence in fundamentals for rising prices, but not for prices to rise as high as they did; 
the rise was amplified by speculation.  
 Silverio and Szklo (2012) trace the influence of the futures market on the spot market 
price from 1990 – 2010 and find the futures market had an increasing influence during the 
2003-2008 price cycle. The authors use EIA data for the daily WTI spot price and front-
month NYMEX light sweet crude contract price in a cointegrated error correction model with 
a Kalman filter. They use the Kalman filter technique to identify changes in the influence of 
the futures market over time (Silverio and Szklo 2012, 1803). 
Fan and Xu (2011) use a multifactor model with structural breaks to discern the role 
of speculation and other market factors on the price of near-month WTI futures. The 
following periods result from identification of structural breaks: January 7, 2000 – March 12, 
2004; March 19, 2004 – June 6, 2008; and June 13, 2008 – September 11, 2009. Speculation 
took the form of two variables: percent of total open interest held by non-commercial traders 
and net long non-commercial futures contracts as a percent of total non-commercial open 
interest.  
During the first period, the variables representing speculation and the dummy 
variables accounting for the September 11
th
 attacks and the start of the second US war in Iraq 
are significant. The remaining variables, Baltic Dry Index, US Dollar Index, COMEX next 
month gold futures price and the S&P 500 Index are not significant.  
In the second period, the variables representing speculation, gold futures, US dollar 
index and S&P 500 Index are all significant; the variable, Baltic Dry Index is not significant. 
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In the final period, both of the variables representing speculation and the US Dollar Index are 
not significant, while the remaining variables are significant.  
In spite of myriad papers espousing one or the other side of the issue – fundamentals 
or speculation – the matter remains unsettled. Ederington, et al (2011) conclude the evidence 
on both sides is inconclusive while, Fattouh, et al (2012) concludes speculators did not play a 
significant role in the dramatic changes in prices, although further research is necessary. In 
spite of the plethora of research, “no definitive or compelling conclusion has been reached” 
(MTOMR 2009, 97). 
The one issue within much of the literature that appears settled is the acceptance of 
the futures market as a representation of the oil price. While not always made explicit, the 
variable termed the “spot” price is the closest-to-expire futures contract. Reliance on the 
closest-to-expiry futures contract as the representation of the spot price of oil and use of 
aggregate supply and demand numbers to represent ‘market fundamentals’ potentially 
invalidate much of the research and confuse the discussion. 
 
Market Context and Financial Flows 
in Oil Futures Markets 
 
Verleger (2011) argues the non-homogeneity of crude oil supply and demand negate 
the conclusions of researchers on both sides of the issue. Likewise, Carollo (2012) adds, 
without including some representation of the refining industry, a model that turns out to be 
correct, can be correct only by accident (pg. 82). Fattouh (2011) focuses on the different 
financial and non-financial layers of the oil-pricing regime and finds that a dualistic 
separation of the financial flows of purely financial players from those of physically involved 
23 
 
players is not feasible, owing to the relationships between physical market prices and futures 
market prices.  
Verleger has been a proponent of the market fundamentals side, although he does find 
financial investors capable of affecting the physical oil market. While Verleger finds 
sufficient ‘fundamental’ reasons for the prices of crude to increase and then collapse, he 
identifies some consequences of large inflows by passive investors (2009). 
Verleger identifies three price cycles, the first of which began in 1995 and continued 
until March of 1999. He identifies this as a period of surplus capacity and growing 
inventories.  
In March 1999 and continuing through early 2004, OPEC producers, namely Saudi 
Arabia, began targeting inventory levels in addition to consumption in an effort to drain 
excess supplies of oil from the market. OPEC successfully drained the accumulated stocks 
and maintained a backwardated futures curve, beginning in 1999 through 2005 (Verleger 
2009, 13). This artificially low supply led to rising crude prices, and thereby, rising product 
prices. 
Beginning in the spring of 2004, strained refining capacity led to increasing product 
prices during the next price cycle. Arbitrage in financial and physical markets led to rising 
crude prices in response. According to Verleger, traders understand the varieties of crudes 
and the varying product slates that result. As product prices rise, crude prices follow, just as 
rising crude prices feeds into product prices (Verleger 2006). 
Also in 2004, hedge funds began purchasing large quantities of oil futures contracts. 
Additional financial institutions soon followed hedge funds, in search for greater returns.  
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By 2005, producers and other commercials active in physical oil markets reduced 
their participation in the futures markets. Rising and volatile prices of the recent past 
minimized potential gain for physical market players who hedged the sale price of crude 
(Verleger 2007; Dittrick 2005).  
In addition to forgoing higher prices, firms record foregone profit resulting from 
derivatives contracts as a loss on financial statements (Dittrick 2005). An increase in demand 
for oil futures, without a corresponding increase in supply led to a rising price of futures 
contracts.  
According to Philip Verleger, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
11
, environmental 
specifications, lackluster historical performance of the refinery industry and growing global 
demand all contributed to the strained refinery capacity, which characterized the middle part 
of the decade. In 2006, according to Verleger’s estimation, oil and product prices needed to 
grow by twenty percent annually, if global growth was to continue at three percent (Verleger 
2009).  
The market for crude oil used to be essentially one, with lower quality crudes priced 
slightly lower, because of the greater portion of less valuable heavy ends (Verleger 2009, 
14). After the enactment of the more strict environmental standards, some refineries lacked 
sufficient capacity to process lower quality crude oils into light products that met the new 
stricter standards.  
                                                 
11
 After the hurricanes (late 2005), President George W. Bush requested the refining industry 
put off previously-scheduled maintenance to compensate for the temporary loss in US 
refining capacity (capacity after the hurricane was one-quarter less than prior to the 
hurricanes). 
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Refiners came to view the crude oil market as two: sweet and sour (Verleger 2009, 3; 
2011). The actions of OPEC further compound the problem. OPEC acts to maintain a stable 
differential between high and low quality crudes (Verleger 2009, 5; 2011). OPEC avoids a 
drastic decline in the price of lower quality crude oil by absorbing the burden of the decline 
in demand for the lower quality crudes.  
  Lastly, Verleger addresses the most notable increase in the price of oil – the rise from 
second half of 2007 through the first half of 2008. Typically, crude oil prices move 
cyclically, peaking during peak demand and declining during lulls in demand. From the end 
of summer until the beginning of the following year, crude prices tend to be relatively low. 
From the end of July 2007, strains in the physical market, caused by a limited supply of light-
sweet crude oil, were beginning to subside and the price of crude oil began the usual cyclical 
decline.  
 As in previous years, the end of July 2007 brought with it a decline in the price of 
crude oil. However, rather than continue to decline, the price of WTI began an ascent to 
$147/bl, reached the following year.  
Aspects of both the physical and financial markets led to a break away from the 
seasonal cycle. In mid-August, the US began refilling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with 
light-sweet crude oil and August 2007 marked the beginning of the US financial crisis 
(Verleger 2008).  
The actions of the Department of Energy brought the return of a tight light sweet 
market and the activities of the Federal Reserve led investors to flee from dollar-denominated 
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assets. As the value of the dollar plummeted, investors moved their funds into assets they 
believed provided a hedge against dollar inflation: particularly, commodity futures markets.  
The Fed initiated rate cuts beginning in August 2007, with two of the largest cuts 
occurring in January 2008. The fear of rising inflation and/or stagflation sent investors to the 
commodity futures markets – index investors, hedge funds, pension funds, etc. CALpers 
alone, reduced fixed-income assets and increased commodity investments “sixteen-fold,” or 
seven billion dollars (Verleger 2008).  
While financial investors were increasing participation in commodity futures, 
physical market players reduced activities in the futures markets, evidenced by the decline in 
total open interest beginning in November 2007 (Verleger 2008). According to Verleger, 
addressing the constraints in the physical oil market alleviates the impact of financial 
investors, both passive and active.  
As is the case with others who have examined the oil market – beyond the upstream – 
Salvatore Carollo (2012) identifies an extremely tight market for specific products – namely 
middle distillates that satisfy the ultra-low sulfur (ULS) specification.  
However, Carollo takes this a step farther in seeing no medium or long-term solution 
to the market tightness. Rather than upgrade refineries sufficiently to deal with the worsening 
crude slate and higher environmental standards, individual refineries have found a 
substitution: profiting on crack spreads in the futures market that are significantly higher than 
actual refinery earnings Carollo (2012). 
Another analyst who approaches the issue by encompassing aspects of both the 
financial and physical market is Robert Mabro of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
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Reference pricing has been common to the oil industry, but the utilization of a futures market 
rather than a physical reference market is a relatively new phenomenon.  
Concerns about the objectivity of price reporting agencies as well as potential 
manipulation of illiquid physical marker streams led participants in the physical oil market to 
set price differentials relative to futures prices rather than prices established in ‘spot’ 
markets, according to Mabro.  
The change from physical spot markets to futures markets appeared as the next 
logical step in market pricing. Futures markets are more difficult to manipulate relative to 
smaller physical markets and exchanges/clearinghouses report prices in a transparent manner 
without the services of any third-party assessor or interpreter.  
According to Mabro (2001; 2005), financial investors rely on information that is 
unreliable and act according to inaccurate market structures. The dominance of financial 
investors causes the price of crude to diverge from where it would settle if traders acted on 
accurate information. More importantly, he questions the advisability of determining the 
price of oil via a contract traded with motives so unlike those involved in the trading of the 
physical product.  
Unlike reference pricing of the past, the “reference” market utilized today is of a 
purely financial nature. When futures markets serve as reference prices, the price of oil is in 
part, a result of portfolio decisions (passive traders) and decisions of traders utilizing 
unreliable data (active traders) in a market regarding a contract that concerns the price of oil 
rather than the delivery of actual physical oil.  
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Mabro finds the downstream to contain the answers to recent changes in the oil 
market, but analysts rely on data about the upstream, US inventories and general 
macroeconomic data. Instead of reliable and timely data about the downstream markets, 
futures market prices move on information that is timelier than it is relevant. 
Of the oil-related factors that influence prices in the futures market, Mabro singles out 
the International Energy Agency’s monthly Oil Market Report. It is not that the data is 
necessarily accurate or relevant, but that traders know other traders will trade on information 
in the report.  
Additionally, since accurate and timely data about world inventory levels is 
unavailable, traders, especially in the market for WTI, over-rely on US inventory data, 
according to Mabro. US inventory data has little to do with the condition of the world oil 
market, but as long as traders are aware that US inventory data moves markets, the influence 
remains.  
While there may be speculative pressures in futures markets, according to Bassam 
Fattouh, also of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, arbitrage between the financial and 
physical markets reduces the ability of the speculator to drive prices without limit. 
According to Fattouh (2010; 2011), there are several related markets that all influence 
the prices of crude oil. The multiple markets encompass different players for diverse reasons. 
These markets have varying degrees of exclusivity as well as degrees of distance from 
physical markets. While some of the markets are exclusive they remain closely connected to 
markets that are more transparent. 
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Fattouh examines the multiple physical and financial markets that make up the Brent 
complex. Recall the three main markets: Dated Brent, (considered the spot market, but 
actually priced 10-25 days from loading), Forward Brent or 25-BFOE, (a highly exclusive 
market, wherein traders may be forced to accept 600,000 barrels of physical crude oil) and 
Brent futures (1000 barrels, cash-settled, at a price that converges to the price of 25-day 
BFOE at expiry).  
Multiple financial markets connect the three Brent markets to each other and to other 
markets around the world. For Fattouh, even though reference prices are futures prices, 
speculation in futures markets are unlikely to be a driving factor in the price of oil. Physical 
market players dominate other markets that are closely related enough to constrain financial 
markets.  
 King et al (2012) also examine whether and to what extent OPEC affects the price of 
oil. The VEC model includes OPEC production quotas, OPEC deviations from quotas, the 
average monthly NYMEX futures price and days of consumption in OECD stocks. All 
variables other than OECD stocks are non-stationary and cointegrated.  
Of the cointegrated variables, OPEC quota tends to “overshoot” in response to a 
deviation from equilibrium relationship. The responses of the oil price and OPEC deviations 
compensate, thereby maintaining the cointegrated relationship. Sequential testing reveals that 
OPEC quotas Granger cause oil prices, oil prices and deviations Granger cause each other, 
and “quotas and deviations both Granger cause each other” (King et al 2012, 45). In the short 
run, days of OECD stocks is significant and negatively related to the oil price.  
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Kaufmann et al (2008) uses dynamic OLS (long-term) and OLS (short-term ECM) to 
examine the impact of refinery capacity, OPEC capacity utilization as a cubic function, the 
term structure of NYMEX crude prices and days forward of OECD stocks on the average 
F.O.B. price of US crude oil imports.  
Results are interesting because of the negative sign on refinery capacity, i.e., as 
refinery capacity increases, the price of crude oil declines. Further investigation of the 
relationship between refinery utilization and Arabian Heavy and Medium reveals that this 
likely results from the originally chosen dependent variable – it includes multiple grades of 
crude oil. Once broken into specific qualities of oil, Kaufmann shows, as refinery utilization 
increases, the price of Arabian Heavy declines relative to Arabian Medium.  
 Kaufmann and Ullman (2009) compare multiple spot crude oil prices and futures 
prices for front-month and five-month contracts in an attempt to establish causal relations 
(Granger causality) among the price series. Using data from both Morningstar and the EIA, 
the authors run pair-wise error correction models on the following crude oils: WTI, Brent, 
Maya, Bonny Light and Dubia-Fetah. The WTI and Brent futures contracts at one and five 
months and the Dubia-Fetah futures at one-month are also included.  
The results suggest price innovations originate from Dubia spot and month five WTI 
futures; these markets are weakly exogenous, i.e., they do not adjust to re-establish the long-
run equilibrium. Brent near-month and Dubia-Fetah each granger cause five of the other 
markets. Bonny light spot granger causes four of the other markets and WTI five-month 
futures granger causes three of the other markets.    
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Kaufmann and Ulman (2009) identified a structural break on August 26, 2004, where 
before this date the two leading crudes were cointegrated, but not after the break (Dubia-
Fetah spot and five-month WTI futures).  
AlMadi and Zhang (2011) compare oil benchmark prices in a VEC model after 
establishing a long-run equilibrium relationship between the price series. The authors use 
daily price data on WTI, Brent, Oman and Dubai, although the source of the data as well as 
the precise market used remains unclear. The authors find: (1) WTI leads Brent, Dubai and 
Oman (2) Brent leads Dubai and Oman and (3) Oman moderately leads Dubai.    
Blair and Mixon (2011) show that there is a difference between the connection of 
WTI prices and retail gasoline prices in different PADDs using the weekly average of the 
WTI-Cushing spot price and “the weekly Monday price of conventional regular gasoline 
reported geographically according to” PADDs (Blair and Mixon 2011, 2).  
Blair and Mixon (2011) find all price series are integrated of order one, and therefore 
set up a seemingly unrelated error correction model. WTI crude price increases affect 
gasoline prices in PADDs II and III the most and PADDs IV and V the least. WTI crude 
price decreases influence PADD II significantly more than other districts, and affect PADDs 
IV and V the least.  
Although the authors do not suggest as much, it is possible prices of international 
crude oils relate closer to retail gasoline prices in PADDs I and IV, since WTI is a land-
locked crude oil. Additionally, the price of gasoline in California entails special regulatory 
standards unique to California.  
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 Lanza, et al., (2005) compare multiple ‘heavy’ crude oils to the relevant benchmark, 
as well as compare crudes of multiple qualities to both a light and a heavy product. The 
qualities of the American crudes are substantially different from the benchmark, in contrast 
to the rest of the regions examined. The authors find the prices of each crude oil examined 
are cointegrated with the reference crude (Brent or WTI) and product prices (Gasoline and 
Fuel oil). Crude oil with qualities similar to the marker or reference crude adjusts faster to the 
long-run equilibrium when the marker crude price changes and the marker price is the 
“driving force” of examined crude oils12 in the short run as well (2005, 845).  
 Denni and Frewer (2006) examine the relationship between the price of Brent and 
multiple product prices at Rotterdam, allowing for asymmetric responses to price changes. In 
the final section, they account for whether past refining margins were positive or negative. 
The authors chose a pair-wise single equation error correction model
13
 because the price of 
Brent is cointegrated with the product price series and the Brent crude oil price is weakly 
exogenous
14
.   
 Their results distinguish between heavy, light and middle products: lighter product 
and middle distillate prices adjust more quickly to changes in the crude oil price than do 
heavy product prices.  
                                                 
12
 Given that the marker crude makes up a large portion of the price of the other crude oils 
examined, this should have been expected. 
13
 The test is set up so that for the Brent variable, the co-efficient representing the adjustment 
to long-run equilibrium is equal to zero, i.e., the Brent price does not adjust to disturbances in 
the long-run equilibrium, but rather product prices adjust in order to maintain the long-run 
equilibrium with the Brent price.  
14
 In the case of premium gasoline the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level of 
significance. 
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Whether there are asymmetric price responses to Brent crude oil price changes was 
inconclusive across all products, until the authors included dummy variables to represent 
whether refining margins were previously positive. The responses to price 
increases/decreases are dependent on past refining margins. Negative past profits leads to 
greater pass-through effects of an increase in the price of crude oil and vice versa.  
 Both Chen et al. (2009) and Refalo (2009) with data from the period 1997 - 2007 find 
that rather than China causing price increases, price innovations result from oil markets in 
Saudi Arabia and the United States. Price innovations that originate in China tend to remain 
in China, rather than reverberate to other oil markets. 
 Li and Lin (2011) expand the oil pricing equation developed in Kaufmann et al 
(2004) by adding the combined total of China and India oil imports. The Kaufmann equation 
already included the number of days of supply in OECD stocks, OPEC quota, OPEC cheat 
and OPEC capacity utilization (the Brent price is the independent variable).  
China and India are both included because the authors could not verify a cointegrated 
relationship until they included a variable for China and India’s share of world imports. The 
variables “Chindia” and OPEC quota are significant, although all variables remain in the 
equation to maintain the long-term relationship.  
The following research examines the details of the oil market that may influence the 
price of oil as well as recent financial activity. The context of the crude oil market entails 
relevant detail in excess of crude oil supply and demand figures. The following literature 
shows that to understand the effects of financial flows in the price of physical crudes, 
research must go beyond the behavior of the futures price. 
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As early as 2003, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) addressed recent 
volatility, rising prices and the speculation issue in its publication, This Week in Petroleum. 
The EIA concluded: market fundamentals drive the prices of crude oil, although factors other 
than fundamentals drive day-to-day price movements (EIA 2003).  
In 2005, the EIA estimated OPEC spare capacity to be around 1 mb/d (EIA 2005). 
The slightest fear of instability in any one of the more than twenty countries that produced at 
least 1 mb/d could cause prices to rise. Similarly, utilized capacity in the downstream was 
persistently near or above ninety percent. Any seemingly-“innocuous” event can change 
expectations and lead to large price swings.  
In a market where flexibility is still very limited, “in the sense of capacity to produce 
significant incremental volumes of crude oil or light products” volatility will remain, 
regardless of the activities of any speculator (EIA 2005)
15
.  
 In addition to the EIA, the International Energy Agency (IEA) examines the 
speculation question in multiple issues of its annual publication, “Medium Term Oil Market 
Report.” In 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 the IEA concludes that market fundamentals drive 
the long-term price of oil, but “clearly other factors – ranging from macroeconomic 
developments, equity and other derivative markets to government policies and geopolitical 
events – can also play a role in influencing oil price levels in the short term” (IEA 2010, 29).  
                                                 
15
 The EIA also addresses the numerous fuel specifications that have passed as of late, 
although they assess the impact to be short term; after an initial adjustment period, prices will 
stabilize, albeit at a higher level, reflecting the increased cost of producing higher quality 
fuels.   
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In the 2009 report, the IEA addresses the reasons the physical market warranted a rise 
and collapse in oil prices and the transmission mechanism whereby the futures market affects 
the spot market.  
Traditional literature claims that inventories are the mechanism whereby the futures 
market affects the spot market. If there is an increase in demand for long-only futures 
contracts, and no corresponding increase in short futures contracts, the price of futures 
contracts increases. An increase in the future price of oil leads to an increase in inventories. 
Since the quantity supplied to the spot market declines, the spot price rises. 
Conversely, if speculation leads spot prices to rise higher than that justified by the 
physical market, excess supply will be forthcoming and inventories must increase to maintain 
the elevated price level. “Indeed, any price above the equilibrium warranted by supply and 
demand, if caused by speculation, must be explained by an act of hoarding in the form of 
inventory builds or withholding production” (IEA 2009, 99). Multiple researchers have 
identified a lack of excessive inventory building as evidence that speculation is not driving 
crude oil prices.  
The caveat to the traditional literature rests on the pricing mechanism within the oil 
market (IEA 2009). Negotiations between sellers and buyers in the crude oil market revolve 
around a differential to a price derived in a futures market. If speculation increases the price 
of crude in futures markets, and the value of the differential remains unchanged, the elevated 
price affects the spot market via the method of pricing in oil markets. The spot oil price can 
potentially rise without any change in inventories or production.  
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While the IEA admits speculation in the futures market can temporarily distort prices 
in the spot market, the report examines multiple issues within the physical market that justify 
a break from trend in the price of oil.  
 OPEC spare capacity fell from 2.3 million barrels per day (mbd) in April 2008 to 1.5 
mbd in July 2008 and the price of oil rose thirty-five dollars. The correlation between OPEC 
spare capacity and the price of oil is as convincing as that of speculator flows and the price of 
oil (MTOMR 2009). Non-OPEC supply has been stagnant or declining, leaving OPEC 
producers holding the spare capacity and drawing attention to their potential power.   
The response of prices to relatively small changes in the oil market can seem 
exaggerated owing to a very low elasticity of supply – estimates vary from .02 - .07 (IEA 
2009). A rising price will elucidate immediate supply responses. However, firms producing 
near capacity can only incrementally increase the production of crude oil. More substantive 
supply responses take longer to initiate because of uncertainty regarding the long-term path 
of the price of oil. After a firm decides a price increase is indicative of a longer-term trend, it 
takes five to ten years for production to begin from new project.  
The elasticity of the demand for crude oil is also relatively low. Much of the 
remaining demand in OECD countries relates to transportation, but changes in transportation 
infrastructure as well as gains in efficiencies take years to actualize. Reductions in demand in 
response to price increases do occur, but taxes in most OECD countries and subsidies in 
several non-OECD countries mute these potential responses.  
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 The causes of the price run-up during 2007 and the first half of 2008 also have to do 
with the relationship between crude oil and petroleum products. OECD sulfur regulations
16
, 
an outdated refinery industry, waning light sweet crude oil supply and a “surge in demand for 
middle distillates” led to a tight market for light sweet crude oil (IEA 2009).  
The market for light sweet crude oil was supply-constrained, and heavier sour crudes 
were not a suitable substitute. The small differential between heavy and light crudes, 
characteristic of the time, further disadvantaged heavier crudes.  
Lastly, the IEA identifies the oil-dollar connection as a contributing factor to the 
latest oil price cycle. A general decline in the value of the dollar benefits consumers and 
harms producers operating in non-dollar economies. When the value of the dollar is falling, 
the price of crude oil may rise even though nothing has changed in the oil market. It is 
possible for changes in the value of the dollar, relative to other currencies, to affect the price 
of oil. 
The International Energy Agency examined the speculation versus fundamentals 
debate in its Medium-Term Oil Market Report (IEA) in June 2009 as well as June 2008. The 
2008 report concludes market fundamentals drive the price of oil. The 2009 report finds 
sufficient justification in the market fundamentals for rising and subsequently falling prices, 
but does allow for the possibility that speculative funds “play a role” in price formation (IEA 
2009, 109).  
                                                 
16
 The US reduced sulfur maximums in 2004 and 2005 (gasoline) and 2006 and 2010 (diesel) 
(EPA Emissions standards reference guide). The EU reduced sulfur allowances in 2000 and 
2005 and the 2005 regulations moved from “must offer” to mandatory in 2009. There have 
been multiple other specification changes aimed at improving the environment since the early 
1990s. Based on the regulations given the most attention, those with the most significant 
long-term impact are the reductions in maximum allowable sulfur content.  
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In 2010 the IEA remained consistent (IEA 2010, 29). In 2011, the IEA concludes the 
following regarding the argument that speculators determine oil prices: “Persuasive as 
though those arguments might be, rigorous analysis suggests otherwise” (IEA 2011, 16). 
Data is still not sufficient to draw conclusions with certainty, but rigorous research suggests 
speculators do not determine oil prices
17
.  
  
                                                 
17
 The IEA changed the publication back to the original name in 2012. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BASIS PRICING IN THE CRUDE OIL MARKET 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the evolving method of oil pricing through to the development 
of the current method. Tracing the development of the system answers why and how the 
existing system arose, including the adoption of futures markets as a part of pricing. The 
three reference markets, including the most important physical and financial markets of each 
are detailed in the chapter, with focus directed to the US and the international benchmarks, 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and the North Sea Market, ‘Brent’ for short. The chapter 
ends after a discussion of the differential to the reference price, which is included in the price 
of all physical oil transactions. 
 
 
The Development of Reference Pricing of Crude Oil 
 
The history of the oil industry is in large part describable as a struggle to control the 
quantity of crude coming out of the ground at any one point in time, in an attempt to sustain 
prices that are high enough to continue the process of production in the long-term. Potential 
over-supply in the oil industry results from the vast quantity of oil in the earth relative to the 
amount needed to satisfy current and near-future demand. Shortages can also result if low 
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prices suppress investments, owing to the long lag between the decision to develop an area, 
and the resulting increase in production. 
The costs of production and market share vary widely across market participants as 
well. Costs are dissimilar, in large part, owing to widely varying characteristics of oil fields. 
A large number of small and medium independents, a handful of large independents and 
integrated firms – both nationally owned and corporate are all operating within the oil 
market. The market also includes the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).  
The market for crude oil requires governance mechanisms to tame uncertainty and 
calm chaos, as does any other market. Successful mechanisms will account for the particular 
characteristics of the oil market. As a relatively old industry, various pricing and other 
governance mechanisms have arisen and been replaced, as the power of particular 
participants and the cultural context, including legal institutions, shift through time.  
In the years that followed the first successful attempt to drill for oil in 1859, prices 
were erratic (Yergin 1991, 27). Through the first half of the 1860s, large swings in price 
occurred as over-supply followed the discovery of a new large oil field, which later led to 
high and rising prices as the same pools began to decline (Yergin 1991, 30-33).  
In the latter half of the 1860s and through the 1870s the industry was plagued by 
overcapacity in the refining sector and oversupply of oil (Yergin 1991, 39-43). In this era of 
overcapacity, the Standard Oil Joint Stock Company was born as was the first period of 
stabilization – that achieved through combination (Ibid). 
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The 1911 dissolution of Standard Oil, the anti-monopoly statutes and the 
development of a handful of large integrated enterprises led to cooperation-oriented 
governance, aimed at taming current supply on the market via coordinating production and 
establishing rules over market share (Yergin 1991, 261). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Price of Oil 1861-1911. BP Statistical Review 2015 US nominal 
price annual average per barrel 
 
 
 
The ‘As-Is’ or Achnacarry agreement, first laid out in August 1928, referred to as the 
Pool Association, established rules to maintain current market shares for all members, 
required joint ventures for expanded production in the middle east and endorsed price 
stability through a system of base point pricing (Yergin 1991, 263-264; Bhattacharyya 2011, 
328-329; Roncaglia 1985, 54-56; Penrose 1968 (1976), 179-180). Members adjusted the 
agreement regularly, owing to internal conflicts and pressures exerted through the activities 
of non-members (Yergin 1991, 265-268).  
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Figure 3.2 Price of Oil 1911-1927. BP Statistical Review 2015 US nominal 
price annual average per barrel 
 
 
 
Under the ‘As-Is’ agreement, prices began with the price at the Gulf of Mexico. The 
cost of freight from the Gulf of Mexico to a particular destination was added to the Gulf of 
Mexico price in order to determine the price at another location (Yergin 1991, 263-264; 
Bhattacharyya 2011, 328-329; Roncaglia 1985, 55). Regardless of the actual location of 
origin, prices were determined as though the oil originated at the Gulf of Mexico and the cost 
of freight
18
 to the destination of interest was added to the Gulf of Mexico price. 
Parties to the agreement met within what had become a familiar context: that of 
overproduction and overcapacity. They enacted the new agreement in an effort to avoid price 
wars, by setting a standard price for all transactions, and these prices acted as administered 
prices (Roncaglia 1985, 57).  
                                                 
18
 According to Penrose, the freight charge was not actually the cost of freight, but a 
standardized freight rate (1976, 180). This would encourage a uniform price as freight rates 
can vary by route and over time. 
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At the time of the agreement, refineries were near to the centers of crude production 
and the US Gulf of Mexico price was chosen because the US was a high cost production area 
and an exporter of petroleum products to the rest of the world (Penrose 1976, 178-180). The 
importance of the agreement, according to Penrose, was the institutionalization of a pricing 
system that encourages stable prices and minimizes price competition: 
a very effective device for ensuring not only that uniform prices are quoted by 
all sellers but also that low-cost producers cannot use their lower costs to 
expand their share of the market by reducing prices. The system is restrictive 
precisely because, when adhered to by all sellers, it prevents the expansion of 
low-cost production by price competition. Ibid 180 
 The base point pricing system relied on the prices of petroleum products at the Gulf 
of Mexico because there was almost no market for crude oil outside of the integrated 
companies and some regular transfers between the large enterprises (Penrose 1967, 178-179).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Price of Oil 1928-1944. BP Statistical Review 2015 US nominal 
price annual average per barrel 
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During the war, a crude oil and an additional product price were added to the base 
point system, at the Persian Gulf (Ibid, 182). By 1948, the base-pricing system was adjusted 
to include two price points in the Middle East (Bhattacharyya 2011, 330-331; Roncaglia 
1985, 57).  
According to Roncaglia, rather than a competitive system of prices, the Middle East 
pricing points were used as internal transfer prices within integrated companies and for the 
purposes of royalty payments to the government of the producing-country (1985, 56). 
Fattouh in Mabro (Ed) agrees, these posted prices for Middle East supplies did not change 
and were a mere fiscal and tax parameter (2006, 45).  
According to Penrose, the new prices were introduced to provide Middle East oil to  
refineries which had been built up nearer to areas of consumption and which were owned by 
the integrated firms (1967, 183-184).  
The increased role of independent producers in the Middle East, the marketing of 
equity oil by producer countries, which began in the 1940s in Venezuela (Yergin 1991, 436), 
and rising Russian exports, led to an excessive supply of oil by the latter half of the 1950s. 
The end of the exclusive control over the price of oil by a handful of large integrated 
companies was nearing (Roncaglia 1985; Bhattacharyya 2011; Yergin 1991; Fattouh in 
Mabro (Ed) 2006). 
The royalty payment to Middle Eastern countries and Venezuela was fifty percent of 
the posted price (minus production costs), but by the 1950s rising supply meant the posted 
price was higher than the actual price oil producers received in the market (Yergin 1991, 
515).   
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In the presence of over-supply there was little producing countries could do in 
response to oil companies beginning to reduce the posted price in the late 1950s. However, 
the price reductions encouraged the formation of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) (Yergin 1991, 516, 523). 
OPEC originally formed in 1960 merely to increase and then stabilize the royalty 
payments made to the governments of producing countries. By the early 1970s, OPEC 
became a more dominant institution in the oil markets, including in setting the price of oil. 
In the 1960s through to 1973, producing companies in the Middle East set the price of 
Arab Light in Saudi Arabia as the posted price (Carollo 2012). “The prices of all other crudes 
were established by referring to the benchmark and fixing a differential…” (Carollo 2012, 
31). Prices were stable as producers matched supply to demand, including for Arab Light 
(Ibid), although in December of 1970, OPEC members pushed for a higher posted price. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Price of Oil 1945-1970. BP Statistical Review 2015 Arabian  
Light posted at Ras Tanura nominal annual average per barrel 
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In 1973, OPEC members, exempting Iraq, unilaterally began increasing the posted 
price of Arab Light (Fattouh in Mabro (Ed.) 2006, 46). By 1975, OPEC administered the 
price of Arab Light and individual countries set an official selling price (OSP), relative to the 
price of Arab Light – the differential to the price of Arab light to reflect the quality and 
location of a member’s particular production (Fattouh in Mabro (Ed.) 2006, 47).  
OPEC set a yearly price for Arab Light and as the producer of Arab Light, Saudi 
Arabia managed the supply of the benchmark crude to ensure the official price reflected the 
price achieved by Arab Light (Carollo 2012, 31). Other members of OPEC maintained some 
influence over the price of the domestic production in setting the value of the differential to 
the price of Arab Light.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Price of Oil 1961-1978. BP Statistical Review 2015 Arabian  
Light posted at Ras Tanura nominal annual average per barrel 
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While a market for crude oil, outside of the control of the large integrated firms began 
in the late 1940s and 1950s and slowly grew in size, the system of administered prices – 
administered at first by large integrated firms, followed by OPEC – remained intact until the 
late 1970s (Fattouh in Mabro (Ed.) 2006, 48-49; Yergin 1991, 435-438, 525-527, 531-532). 
Even through to the late 1970s, producing countries sold most equity production back to the 
integrated oil companies who had originally turned over the volumes to the state (Fattouh in 
Mabro (Ed) 2006, 49). 
In 1979, “the seizure of power by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the revolution in Iran and 
the break-out of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980” (Carollo 2012, 32) led to falling 
supply and rising demand and a second round of price increases (Bhattacharyya 2011, 334; 
Fattouh in Mabro 2006, 49).  
Falling production along with panic buying led prices for one-time exchanges of 
crude oil, or “spot market transactions” to soar beyond the official administered price (Ibid.). 
This secondary market, where independent parties engaged in exchanges of oil outside of 
long-term deals had slowly but steadily developed, and was now taking on an increasing 
significance
19
. The war-related loss of production plunged OPEC volumes to just under 
22mn b/d in 1981, from over 30mn b/d in 1979 (BP 2014).  
Some OPEC countries nullified contracts in an effort to stop companies from 
purchasing equity contract-volumes, based on the administered price or OSP, only to sell the 
                                                 
19
 Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of the paper uses ‘spot market’ as this one-off 
type of exchange. This contrasts with most of the literature discussed in chapter two, where 
spot market refers to the near-term price of oil or the closest-to-expiry futures contract.  
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volumes at a profit in the spot market (Bhattacharyya 2011). According to Bhattacharyya, 25 
percent of OPEC sales occurred in spot markets (2011, 334). 
The panic buying drove crude oil stocks up to record levels, capable of covering 180 
days of demand – previously, crude oil stocks tended to cover between 30 and 50 days of 
demand (Carollo 2012, 33).  
The bold moves of the producing countries and the second oil price shock provoked 
two important responses. Major oil companies invested in new sources of crude oil to replace 
their reserves in the Middle East, and interest in energy conservation and diversification of 
energy sources in consuming countries arose. Both of these reactions diminished the price 
administering capabilities of OPEC (Carollo 2012, 34; Bhattacharyya 2011, 334; Fattouh in 
Mabro 2006, 50). 
The increased level of non-OPEC production and the high levels of stocks resulted in 
falling demand for OPEC crude. Growing numbers of sellers and buyers resulted in a more 
active spot market for crude oil, diminishing the volumes that contract buyers would take 
from OPEC sellers (Fattouh in Mabro 2006, 50). Even OPEC members would turn to spot 
markets to dispose of oil they could not sell in contract markets (Carollo 2012, 34).  
Non-OPEC production had been on the rise since 1975, but was still lower than 
OPEC production by 1979, at just under 24.25mn b/d – OPEC production was more than 
30mn b/d (BP 2014). Non-OPEC production steadily increased, and by 1985 it was about 
29.57mn b/d, while OPEC production had fallen to 15.87mn b/d (BP 2014). Of the almost 
15mn b/d loss in OPEC production, Saudi Arabia had given up about 6.7mn b/d (BP 2014). 
 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Price of Oil 1974-1985. BP Statistical Review 2015 Arabian  
Light posted at Ras Tanura 1974-1983, Dated Brent 1984-1985, nominal  
annual average per barrel 
 
 
 
In 1985, Saudi Arabia chose to abandon the role of swing producer as well as the 
system of OPEC-administered prices. Saudi Arabia had been defending the price of Arab 
Light, and giving up significant market share in the process. In 1980, Saudi production 
peaked at a yearly average of nearly 10.3mn b/d and by 1985, the yearly average stood at 
3.6mn b/d (BP 2014). 
In September 1985, Saudi Arabia warned market participants of their intention to 
abandon the pricing system and adopt netback pricing, in an effort to regain their market 
share. Netback pricing guarantees a refiner a given profit margin by adjusting the price of 
crude, relative to the sale price of oil products.  
The refining margin – or the difference in the sale prices of petroleum products and 
the price of the crude – is the variable of interest to a refiner. Refiners view the cost of crude 
oil in relation to the sale prices of products. Under netback pricing, refiners can run at 
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capacity while maintaining a guaranteed margin - Saudi Arabia’s pricing mechanism would 
account for falling product prices as refiners increased output. 
Netback pricing incentivized refiners to increase crude oil flows regardless of the 
price of the petroleum, because netback crude pricing adjusts the price of crude downward to 
account for falling product prices. If increased throughput at refineries pressured product 
prices downward, Saudi Arabia would compensate by reducing crude prices – thereby 
enabling refiners to maintain a profit, while the market share of Saudi Arabia increased.  
The National oil company of Mexico, commonly referred to as Pemex, faced a 
difficult choice: continue attempting to administer prices to the market, which if prices were 
not competitive, would cause great losses in the quantity of crude sold, adopt netback prices 
or adopt a different mechanism.  
 Pemex lacked sufficient staff to decipher the constantly changing competitive market 
prices for the available quantities of crude oil. Negotiating prices and margins with refineries 
was less than optimal. Refineries not only held superior information regarding cost and 
structure, they also could threaten to purchase from any one of Pemex’s competitors as soon 
as the terms appeared less than competitive, making administering prices to the market 
difficult (Mabro 2005, 7).  
If Pemex officials were directly involved in the setting of oil prices and Pemex lost 
significant sums, those officials could potentially be criminally charged, even if they acted 
“in good faith” owing to the 1985 passage of the Federal Law of Responsibilities for Public 
Servants (Flores-Macias 2009, 9).  
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Pemex instead adopted reference or marker-based pricing. The marker price consisted 
of a basket of prices determined in US domestic spot markets (Mabro 2005, 9). Pemex would 
set an adjustment factor, or differential, to the spot market determined basket price (Mabro 
2005). The method Pemex adopted was familiar, while introducing a fundamental change. 
The system of administered prices was failing, in part, because of trade in spot 
markets and the inability of the administered price to adapt quickly to changing spot market 
prices. Pemex maintained the familiar differential pricing method, but Pemex attached the 
differential to prices determined in spot markets.  
The choice by Pemex management enabled the implementation of prices that are in 
line with those in spot markets, with minimal managerial discretion. Pemex adopted a pricing 
mechanism the rest of the oil-producing industry soon copied, with Saudi Arabia adopting a 
similar method in 1987 (Flores-Macias 2010, 172). Formula, reference or basis pricing—via 
prices determined in spot markets—replaced OPEC administered pricing (Fattouh 2007).  
Reference pricing requires assessing relative values in the crude oil market, although 
such was not a new phenomenon, as when OPEC administered the price of Arab Light, 
OPEC members set their official selling price at a differential to Arab Light.  
Formula, reference, benchmark or basis pricing, in its simplest form, follows: 
“𝒟” represents the pricing differential between reference crude “X” and an individual crude, 
“Y”: 
𝑃𝑦 = 𝑃𝑥 ±  𝒟 
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Figure 3.7 Price of Oil 1984-2000. BP Statistical Review 2015 Dated Brent 
nominal annual average per barrel 
 
 
 
Under formula pricing, the price of crude Y is set relative to the price of benchmark 
crude, X. Crude producers determine the direction and magnitude of the difference between 
the value of the benchmark crude and their own crude, without setting the price of either.  
Several factors are capable of changing the price of a particular crude oil. In giving up 
administering the entire price to the market, producers no longer have to play catch up or try 
to anticipate precise prices determined in spot markets. Instead, producers determine the 
value of their particular crude oil in relation to a separate market for crude oil – the latter 
price is determined through trade in spot markets. 
The increased role of spot markets and other transactions outside of large integrated 
firms forced an adjustment to the system of administered prices. By moving away from 
administering prices to the market, producers alleviated the growing tension between prices 
in spot markets and those in longer-term contract markets. 
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 Just as in the era of OPEC-administered prices, in the modern era, the price of oil is 
comprised of a minimum of two values. Today’s version of Arab Light is typically one of 
three reference prices: one related to the market for domestic light sweet production in the 
US, one from offshore production in the North Sea, and the latest addition, produced nearer 
to the newest large oil consumer – China – comprised of the Oman-Dubai markets. 
All three of these markets have a futures contract associated with the relevant 
physical crude oil. Futures markets for crude oil developed alongside the move to using spot-
market prices for exchanges of oil in longer term or contract markets. After crude oil futures 
markets became more transparent and liquid, prices determined in futures markets began to 
replace prices determined in the trade of physical oil, as the reference or basis price in some 
markets. However, as is shown below, these futures markets are highly connected to the 
related physical market.  
The current reference price in the US is a light sweet crude oil delivered to/priced at 
Cushing, Oklahoma. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is the colloquial name of the US 
benchmark, although the market consists of light sweet crude not necessarily originating 
from west Texas. A related Light Sweet crude oil contract is traded on the NYMEX 
exchange, hosted by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Cushing, Oklahoma is the 
pricing point for the futures contract. Some form of the price of domestic light sweet or 
‘WTI’ serves as the reference price for much of the domestically transferred crude oil within 
the US, as well as serves as a part of the price of some of the oil imported into the US. 
The North Sea crude oil market makes up the international reference market 
sometimes referred to as Brent. The North Sea market, in part, consists of a closely related 
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physical, forward and futures market. Some form of the North Sea market price plays the role 
of the market price in most internationally exchanged crude oil, including some US imports.  
The final and third main reference price is somewhat controversial as a benchmark as 
commentators debate the role of the Dubai-Oman market. Dubai-Oman prices tend to 
represent conditions of demand in the Asian market, but also closely relate to the North Sea 
market. The Dubai-Oman market also consists of several related markets. 
 
The North Sea Market (Brent) 
 
The North Sea benchmark developed out of the spot and forward market for Brent 
crude oil.  “In the early 1980s, the Brent market only consisted of the spot market and the 
informal physical forward market,” created largely for tax spinning (Fattouh in Mabro (ed.) 
2006, 52). Tax spinning was the term used for selling or buying in the Brent spot and forward 
markets, in an effort to minimize taxable assets, thereby minimizing tax liabilities. Integrated 
oil companies would weigh the tax liabilities associated with internal transfer prices relative 
to those levied through selling and buying in both the spot and forward markets
20
.  
Those who desired a Western replacement for the role Arabian Light embraced the 
North Sea market as a benchmark (Carollo 2012, 90). Moreover, OPEC thought the physical 
benchmark role would make the producers in the North Sea restrict quantity as necessary - 
share the role of swing producer (Carollo 2012, 101; Fattouh 2007, 26). 
The original physical base of the North Sea benchmark, Brent, was a mix of several 
crude oils from fields in the North Sea brought together and transported to a terminal at 
                                                 
20
 For more about the role of tax-spinning on the development of spot and forward markets in 
the North Sea, see Mabro (Ed.) 1986 and Horsnell and Mabro 1993. 
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Sollum Voe via pipeline. Although the way oil is extracted will affect the overall amount of 
oil recovered as well as the amount that can be recovered before production decline sets in, 
production in individual fields begins to decline eventually (Adelman 1993; Mabro (Ed.) 
2006). 
As production naturally declined, the physical base of the benchmark was expanded 
in order for the North Sea market to remain an international pricing benchmark.  The smaller 
the physical production of a benchmark, the more easily market participants can corner the 
market, and the more likely it is to tend to a contango market structure. 
In a contango market, prices increase in the future. Contracts for delivery farther in 
the future are more expensive than contracts with a nearer delivery date. At any point in time, 
the farther forward the contract, the more expensive the oil. If production is falling, market 
participants may be convinced that the price will indefinitely rise in the future as supply 
continues to decline.  
In 1990, in order to increase the liquidity of the Brent benchmark, Brent and Ninian 
were blended. Ninian was a separate crude oil that previously traded as an individual grade. 
After the comingling of the Brent and Ninian crudes, the Brent blend consisted of “the 
production of around 15 fields in the North Sea” (Carollo 2012, 89).   
To assure market participants a sufficient number of trades were involved in the 
assessment of such an important benchmark, as production of the Brent/Ninian blend began 
to decline, another expansion of Brent became necessary. In 2002, two other grades of crude 
oil were added to the North Sea benchmark price, Forties and Oseberg, and a third, Ekofisk, 
was added in 2007 (Platts 2015). 
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Since 2007, and as of 2015, transactions involving (1) the Brent/Ninian blend, which 
is carried through pipeline to the Shetland Islands, UK, (2) Forties, which is also carried by 
pipeline, but to Hound Point, UK, (3) Oseberg, a Norwegian crude oil delivered to the Sture 
terminal, and (4) Ekofisk (Teesside, UK) are acceptable for inclusion in the North Sea 
benchmark (Fattouh 2011, 37-38; Argus 2012; Platts 2011, 2; Fielden 2012).  
The North Sea market is the most commonly utilized benchmark for the international 
transfer of physical crude oil. Although estimates vary, 50-70% of all internationally traded 
crude oil utilizes some form of the North Sea market as a benchmark in pricing formulas 
(Energy Intelligence 2006, A22; Fattouh 2011, 20; Platts 2011, 2; Carollo 2012).   
The international status is in part a result of the market being waterborne. North Sea 
crude is capable of representing any demand center in the world, through delivery to the 
region willing to pay the highest price in the spot market.  
Three markets within the North Sea complex of markets are essential to the pricing of 
the North Sea benchmark. Of the three markets, the physical, forward and futures markets, 
the first two have existed since the days of tax spinning. Several other markets serve to 
connect the three general markets to each other
21
.  
The prompt physical North Sea market, termed “Dated”22 refers to a 600,000-barrel 
cargo or 100,000-barrel partial cargo of crude oil with a known date of loading. Terminal 
operators communicate loading dates to producers no less than one month in advance of the 
                                                 
21
 There are many other paper markets in addition to those mentioned. The peripheral paper 
markets serve to offer greater hedging protection and increase the connections between the 
various paper markets and between the paper markets and the physical market.  
22
 Platts uses the term Dated Brent while Argus uses North Sea Dated. Both terms refer to the 
prompt physical market for the North Sea benchmark crudes. 
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first of the three days of loading. A date of loading is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a cargo to be included in the price of the Dated benchmark.   
The daily price of Dated represents the price of physical crude in the North Sea 
market loading 10 days to one month in the future. Every business day, the dates under 
consideration “roll” forward by one (Argus 2015; Platts 2015). A transaction for a cargo of 
crude scheduled for loading nine or fewer days in the future will not be included in the 
calculation of the price of Dated. 
Dated does not include transactions occurring for cargos loadings nine or fewer days 
ahead because such transactions tend to concern ‘distressed’ cargoes. A distressed trade – a 
desperate seller or buyer – is not representative of the broader market. The term “spot” used 
to describe the Dated market can be considered as a contrast to contract markets, rather than 
as the price of crude oil delivered today. 
The Dated market originally included transactions for cargoes loading up to 15-days 
ahead, then 21-days followed by 25-days, and most recently, as of January 2015, one month 
ahead. The Dated and forward markets are closely related, as the forward market is a market 
for the same four crude streams, but the contract refers to loading months without a particular 
loading window.  
The buyer and seller of a North Sea forward contract know the month during which 
the cargo will load. However, in contrast to a Dated contract, the particular dates of loading 
for the crude transferred in the forward market remain undetermined.   
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Similar to the Dated market, the forward market consists of bi-lateral contracts to 
buy/sell 600,000 barrels or 100,000 partial cargoes of Brent, Forties, Oseberg or Ekofisk, but 
the precise three-day loading window is unknown to both parties.  
Upon notification of the three-day loading window, if the holder of a long or buy 
forward contract does not wish to take possession of the 600,000 or 100,000 barrels of crude 
oil and he is holding a short or sell contract, he notifies the buyer of his sell contract. It is 
common practice for a single cargo of crude oil to move through several contract-holders, 
after the original seller identifies his three-day loading window and before the trading ceases.  
That is, “if the original cargo purchaser has already sold another [month ahead] 
contract,” and does not wish to take delivery upon notification, “he must give notice to the 
new buyer to take the cargo at least [one month] in advance” (Fattouh 2011, 41). The “daisy 
chain” ceases when a nominated buyer accepts delivery – either by preference or because he 
does not have a sell contract for the relevant month – or the minimum period for notification 
passes. A participant “is said to have been ‘five-o-clocked’” if he did not want to acquire the 
actual physical oil, but he is out of time to notify the next potential buyer (Fattouh 2011, 41).  
Forward contracts are cash settled most of the time but can potentially end in a 
transaction of 600,000 or 100,000 barrels of physical crude oil. If every buyer in the forward 
Brent market desired to take possession of physical oil, a discrepancy between supply and 
demand would arise. There have been times of chaos in the forward Brent market as contract-
holders discerned daisy chains, but large suppliers in the North Sea have been willing to calm 
the fury (Mabro 1986).    
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Once the notification period has passed and a loading window has been determined, 
the cargo is 'wet’ and the physical oil involved in the forward Brent contract becomes Dated, 
if the cargo is involved in another exchange prior to ten or more days from loading.  
The underlying Brent physical market consists of two different but related 
kinds of physical Brent: ‘Cash BFOE’ which is a ‘paper’ or ‘forward’ cargo 
(within a stated contract or delivery month, but without a vessel, date or 
number attached) and ‘Dated Brent’ which has all of these three elements. 
(ICE Brent FAQ 2013, 6) 
The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
host the Brent futures contract, named after the first physical North Sea crude oil used as a 
benchmark or reference price. The Brent futures contract relates to the price of Brent, Forties, 
Oseberg or Ekofisk cargos loading within a particular month.  
There are several distinctions between the Brent futures markets and the other two 
reference markets – the Dated and forward markets. The most important difference in the 
futures market and the other two markets is the lack of physical delivery in the former. Brent 
futures contracts enable exposure to the price of the North Sea benchmark but do not involve 
the exchange of physical crude oil.  
The Brent futures contract is a purely financial instrument used by genuine hedgers, 
traders, bankers and other financial investors. The only way a holder of a Brent futures 
contract can acquire physical oil is by taking the trade “off-exchange” and transacting in the 
exchange of futures for physicals (EFP) market.  
An exchange, such as the CME or the ICE, stands between counterparties who are 
anonymous to each other in the futures market.  The exchange is exposed to counterparty 
risk, rather than the participants in a futures market. This is in contrast to over-the-counter 
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(OTC) markets, such as the Dated and forward markets, where parties to a transaction are 
exposed to the risk of a counterparty defaulting, or credit risk. 
The Brent futures market is the most transparent and least exclusive of three main 
North Sea markets. A single futures contract concerns the price of 1000 barrels of crude oil – 
compared to the 600,000 barrels or 100,000-barrel partial in the Dated and forward markets. 
Investors purchase the contracts on margin, although the exchange protects itself by requiring 
the parties to settle loses regularly.  
 In addition to these three Brent markets, several ancillary markets have developed, all 
of which connect to the primary markets and aid in the process of price determination. The 
most important ancillary markets for pricing of the Brent complex, are the contract for 
differences (CFD) and EFP swaps markets. A swap is an over-the-counter exchange of price 
exposure (Platts 2012, 2).  
The CFD market, “allow[s] the buyer and seller to gain exposure to the price 
differential between [D]ated BFOE and forward Brent” (Fattouh 2011, 45). Increasing 
volatility between the price in the Dated and forward market and the need of physical players 
to hedge this price discrepancy, led to the creation of the CFD market (Fattouh 2011, 45).  
Since the forward market is the price of Dated farther in the future, the CFD 
differentials in the CFD market show the ‘anticipated’ price of Dated. The forward price plus 
or minus the value of the CFD shows the perception today for the price of Dated beyond the 
current 10 day to month ahead pricing period for Dated. This value is the expected or 
anticipated value of Dated. 
61 
 
The EFP market relies on a concept similar to that of the CFD market, although it 
relates the forward price to the Brent futures price. Market participants use the EFP market to 
hedge the price discrepancy between the price of Brent futures and those in the forward 
market.  
The value of the EFP shows the price difference between the Brent futures market 
and the forward market. If there is no trade in the forward market, the price in the EFP and 
the price of the Brent futures contract show the perceived price in the forward market. 
The particular crude streams that make up the North Sea market, Brent, Forties, 
Oseberg and Ekofisk, are traded at differentials to the North Sea Dated benchmark price 
around the time of loading. At the time of the agreement, the outright price is unknown, as 
the price of North Sea Dated around the dates of loading is unknown. 
In order to determine the price of Dated on a particular day, values for each of the 
four grades must be constructed in order to determine the cheapest of the four grades. The 
cheapest of the grades sets the price of the benchmark because anyone required to deliver one 
of the grades will always chose to deliver the crude with the lowest price. 
The differentials determined by negotiations for trades of each of the four grades are 
applied either to the value of anticipated dated or the forward price, “whichever is in favor by 
the market at the time,” typically anticipated Dated (Argus 2015).  
The differentials resulting from spot negotiations for all four grades are applied to 
value of anticipated Dated or BFOE forward around the dates of loading for the period 
related to the relevant transaction. The cheapest of the four constructed prices sets the price 
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of North Sea Dated. In order to determine the price of each of the four grades, Brent, Forties, 
Ekofisk, and Oseberg, the respective differentials are applied to the price of North Sea Dated. 
Following the addition of the Buzzard field to the Forties blend, Forties usually set 
the price of Brent. The quality of the four crudes is as follows: Brent 37.9 API and .45% 
sulfur; Forties 40.3 API and .56% sulfur; Oseberg API 37.8 and .27 sulfur; Ekofisk 37.5 API 
and .23 sulfur (Argus April 2015, 9). The relatively higher sulfur content in Forties makes it 
the least valuable, and thereby, typically the price-setter.  
Owing to the variance in the quality of the grades of crude used to make up the 
benchmark, market premiums are subtracted from the grades of relatively better quality, 
Ekofisk and Oseberg. Without the quality premiums, the crude with the lowest quality – 
Forties – would always set the benchmark.  
Forward market trade for the North Sea benchmark crude takes place under the Shell 
UK oil contract or the SUKO-90. The quality premiums as laid out in the contract are equal 
to “sixty percent of the daily average of the Oseberg Differential less the Lowest Grade 
Differential for [Month 2]…” (Modifications to SUKO-90, 2). The same calculation is 
applied for Ekofisk based on the spread between the Ekofisk differential and the lowest of 
the four grades. Quality premiums began June 2013 (Platts April 2013; Argus April 2015).  
The relevant quality premiums are subtracted from Oesberg and Ekofisk prior to 
determination of the lowest price of the four grades of crude oil. If a seller delivers Ekofisk 
or Oseberg in fulfillment of the forward contract, the price will be adjusted, making the buyer 
responsible for the quality premium. If the average between Ekofisk/Oseberg and the lowest 
price of the four is less than 25¢/bl, the quality premium is zero. 
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Despite all of the attention given to the futures market and participants therein, the 
Brent futures market does not play a direct role in the price assessment of Dated Brent. 
Rather, the markets that directly inform the assessed price of Dated Brent are more exclusive 
and opaque than are futures markets.  
According to Argus, if the market for forward Brent is illiquid – considered less than 
100,000 barrels reported in one day – the futures market will indirectly affect the 
determination of the price of forward Brent (Argus 2012, 4). Specifically, in times of 
illiquidity, forward Brent is a function of the front-month futures contract and “the value of 
an exchange for physicals [EFP] contract
23” (Argus 2012, 4). However, “this almost never 
happens,” (Barret, 6) exempting some rare periods of exceptionally low liquidity in late 2007 
and late 2008. Even in 2007 and 2008, most trading days had greater than the 100,000 barrel 
minimum (Fattouh 2011, 41-43). Even in these rare times of illiquidity, the futures market 
alone does not determine the assessed price of Dated BFOE. 
 The futures price is determined through anonymous sellers and buyers, transacting 
through an exchange, except for the settlement price on the day of expiry. At expiry, the 
Brent futures market converges to the price of the volume-weighted average of first and 
second month forward Brent, taking account of market structure – contango or 
backwardation. The method of settlement ensures the futures contract remains closely tied to 
the physical market despite the inability to take physical delivery through the futures 
exchange. 
                                                 
23
 “EFPs are often quoted as differentials to the Brent futures price but usually do not exceed 
it by more than a few cents” (Fattouh 2011, 44).  
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Trading in the Brent forward market has become increasingly concentrated. In 1986, 
the largest ten firms accounted “for about 50% of trading,” but “over 80% by 1998” (Energy 
Intelligence 2006, A23-A24). Of the less than 40 traders in 2001, “the number of traders with 
market muscle had shrunk to a dozen” and the number of trades per day was around three 
(Energy Intelligence 2006, A24). According to data from Argus, in Fattouh (2011), between 
2007 and 2010, there were four to twelve companies per month operating in the forward 
Brent market in a typical month
24
.  
 Along with the futures contract, the forward contract also trades on a flat price – an 
outright price. This is in contrast to the Dated market, where traders negotiate only a 
differential to the flat price. 
 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
 
In the United States, WTI includes land-based crudes from Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas 
and New Mexico. WTI travels via a pipeline system to several locations within the Midwest 
and Gulf coast. Cushing, OK and Midland, TX are the traditional pricing centers of WTI 
crude oil and prices in the two locations are not typically at parity (as of the March 2015 
trade month, both Argus and Platts launched a third WTI pricing location – Houston, Texas).  
Cushing is the pricing center of the futures contract as well as a storage and pipeline 
hub for crude oil unrelated to the futures market. Multiple pipelines meet in Cushing and 
Cushing is one of the largest storage sites for crude oil in the US.    
                                                 
24
 Argus and Platts attempt contact with all market participants, however, those represented 
in the data may not include all traders. 
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The CME NYMEX Light Sweet futures contract relates to domestic light sweet crude 
(WTI) at the Cushing, OK pricing point. A WTI futures contract is a contract to buy or sell 
1,000 barrels of WTI crude oil (or an accepted substitute) through the Cushing hub. Unlike 
Brent futures, a WTI futures contract guarantees access to physical crude, although most 
traders close their contracts prior to expiry, thereby abstaining from the physical side of the 
market. The WTI futures market is the most transparent and least exclusive of the WTI 
markets.  
The pipeline delivery scheduling process for physical crude oil delivered to Cushing, 
OK guides the expiration date of the futures contract. “For US pipelines, shipments must be 
scheduled no later than the 25
th
 day of the preceding month” (Argus 2012, 5). By the 25th of 
the calendar month, traders finalized schedules for the transfer of crude via pipeline during 
the following calendar month, known as the delivery month. The front-month futures 
contract expires – the front month rolls forward – three business days prior to the pipeline-
scheduling deadline
25
.  
A discrepancy in time exists between the physical and futures front-month for three 
days after expiry of the futures contract and prior to the pipeline-scheduling deadline. 
Physical WTI trade refers to deliveries made in the following calendar month, while WTI 
futures contracts refer to two calendar months ahead. 
For example, from 26 October until 25 November, physical spot trade relates to crude 
delivered in the calendar month of December. This calendar period is the December pipeline 
                                                 
25
 The closest preceding business day replaces weekend and holiday deadlines for pipeline 
scheduling as well as futures expiration. 
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trade month. In contrast, from 23 October until 22 November, December is the front-month 
futures contract or futures contract trade month.  
Argus and Platts publish the spot price of WTI-Cushing daily. Exempting the three-
day window discussed above, according to Argus, the assessed spot price of WTI-Cushing is 
equal to “Nymex sweet crude futures settlements at 1:30 p.m. Central time” for each of the 
next four months (Argus 2012, 5). Platts uses reported WTI trade at 2:15 p.m. to determine 
the daily price of WTI. 
For each of the three days of the physical and financial discrepancy in the prompt 
trade month, Argus assesses the WTI spot price at Cushing from the “Month-One/Month-
Two Cash Roll” market26 (Argus 2012, 5). Conversely, the Platts assessment of the WTI-
Cushing market rolls forward one day prior to front-month expiry of the futures contract, i.e., 
from the example above, 21 November.  
Market participants use the WTI trade month average, WTI Calendar month average 
(CMA) and WTI postings plus (P-Plus) prices as a WTI benchmark, rather than the price of a 
WTI futures contract at a single point in time.  
The WTI trade month average is an average of the daily settlement price of the 
NYMEX futures contract over the entire trade month. If an Argus trade month average is 
used, the three days of roll trades are included in the average, while the Platts’ WTI trade 
month average will include four fewer days, as Platts’ WTI rolls one day prior to the 
NYMEX expiry. 
                                                 
26
 The month-one/month-two cash roll refers to the cost of rolling month-one physical WTI 
into a month two-deliveries of WTI. Argus assesses the price daily as a volume-weighted 
average of trade occurring throughout each of the three days. 
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The WTI CMA is used as a benchmark in an attempt to account for the time 
discrepancy between the trade month and the delivery month. The average of the daily 
closing price of WTI front-month futures over the calendar month equals that month’s CMA 
basic price.  
For most of the calendar month (roughly two-thirds), the front-month futures contract 
relates to delivery in the following calendar month. For the remainder of the calendar month, 
the front-month futures contract is two calendar months ahead. The largest portion of the 
CMA price is the average of the daily front-month prices during the calendar or delivery 
month.  
The “NYMEX CMA roll adjust” compensates for the forward-looking foundation of 
the “basic” CMA calculation (Fielden 2012). The basic CMA price for delivery 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 is 
based on an average of daily prices in the futures market for 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+2 during 
every trading day
27
 of the calendar month.  
The CMA roll adjust assesses the difference between the price of (1) 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 and 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 and (2) 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+2.  
In order to assess the roll adjust, a “trade month average” must be calculated 
for 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 , 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+2. A trade month average is an average of the 
settlement price of a single futures contract during a single trade month. An average for each 
of the futures contracts 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡,  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+2, during trade 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡, is used to 
“adjust” the basic CMA calculation.  
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 Most CMA calculations include values for days when the NYMEX is open, i.e., “Merc 
Days” although some extend the preceding settlement price to weekends and holidays, 
thereby including all “Calendar Days” (Argus 2012, 5).   
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The CMA calculation for 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡  is adjusted by the value of the difference between 
the 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 trade month average and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡  and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+2, weighted for 
the number of days each futures contract spent as the front month during calendar 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡.  
Another WTI price is the posted price. Posting companies “post” the daily prices they 
are willing to pay or at which they will sell WTI crudes. Some posting companies are 
purchasers while others are producers. Posted prices are typically the price of crude oil “at 
the wellhead,” (Fielden 2012). The WTI posting-plus price represents the posted price, 
adjusted for transportation costs to Cushing.  
According to RBN Energy
28
, the P-Plus price contains two components, each of 
which accounts for a distinct period: the trade month and the delivery month. The average 
posting price during the delivery month and the average posting premium during the trade 
month (the month prior to delivery, ending on the 25
th
 day of the preceding month) equals the 
WTI P-Plus price.  
The most commonly used posting within the industry, according to Argus Media, is 
the Phillips 66 posting price (Argus 2012, 6).  
 
Oman/Dubai 
 
Much of Asian-delivered oil is priced via a Dubai benchmark. Originally, the Dubai 
benchmark referred only to crude oil produced by the Dubai Petroleum Company (a 
consortium of several majors as well as a government stake) operating offshore of the Dubai 
territory of The United Arab Emirates. However, similar to the Brent and WTI markets, 
multiple markets make up what traders refer to as the ‘Dubai’ benchmark. While the methods 
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 Neither Platts nor Argus provides details regarding the calculation of WTI P-Plus. 
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of Platts and Argus differ, the interplay of multiple markets results in prices for the reference 
crudes. 
Dubai crude oil is a medium sour crude oil, with a sulfur content of 2.04% and typical 
API gravity of 31° (Argus 2013, 14). The Dubai price, as a benchmark has fallen out of favor 
since production of Dubai crude has declined to 80,000 bpd in 2009 (Leaver 2010, 3) and the 
Dubai market fails to satisfy any diversity of ownership criterion. In 2007, the government 
replaced equity producers with a government-owned company (Fattouh 2012, 62).  
As production declined, the physical base of the benchmark expanded to include 
crude oil produced in Oman. Omani production, at close to 800,000 bpd in 2009, is 
substantially greater than Dubai (Leaver 2010, 3). Oman, with a typical sulfur content of 
1.06% and API gravity of 33.3° is slightly heavier and has about half of the sulfur content of 
Dubai (Argus 2013, 14).  
The price of Dubai is determined in two different ways. Platts assesses the price 
based on trades in the Platts MOC window, where the buyer must accept Dubai, Oman or 
Upper Zakum
29
 crude oil. If the buyer is not willing to accept Oman and Upper Zakum in 
place of Dubai, Platts will not consider the trade in their assessment of Dubai (Platts January 
2013, 13).  
In addition to expanding the accepted crude oils, in 2004 Platts also expanded the 
assessment to the trading of partial cargoes. Partial cargoes are 25,000-barrel ‘slices’ of a 
500,000 barrel cargo. Since such a small lifting does not occur, partial trades are cash settled 
                                                 
29
 The UAE also produces Upper Zakum. 
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unless a seller trades “19 partials with a single counterparty30” (Platts January 2013, 13). 
Immediately upon selling the 19
th
 parcel, the trade becomes physical. The buyer is obligated 
to take delivery and the seller is obligated to lift crude. At the time of physical convergence, 
the seller must declare which of the three grades he will lift (Platts March 2013).  
Platts assess the Dubai price on the trading of partials in the Platts window for three 
months forward. However, at the time of assessment, traders are discussing crude oil that will 
be loaded two or three months forward. The front-month Platts Dubai assessment is always at 
least one month away. At the first of each new month, the assessment rolls forward. In 
January, Platts will assess the Dubai price for the months of March, April and May. On 
February 1, the assessment changes to April, May and June.  
In addition to the price of physical Dubai, Platts also assesses the price of Dubai 
swaps – cash-settled financial Dubai. Platts assesses prices for three months forward, 
although the assessment lags the assessment of physical Dubai by one month. “In January, 
for example, the first month swap assessed is February, followed by March and April” (Platts 
March 2013, 14). During the same period, Platts’ assessments of physical Dubai is for the 
months March, April and May. Similar to the physical market, assessments roll over on the 
first of every month.  
In the event that there are no partials traded in the Platts MOC window, Platts assess 
the price of Dubai through additional financial swap markets. Similar to other benchmarks, 
multiple OTC swap markets exist around Dubai, wherein traders exchange exposure to time 
                                                 
30
 The discrepancy between the 19 partials and a 500,000-barrel cargo results from volume 
tolerance of -5% (Platts March 2013, 14). Contracts for crude oil include a specified volume 
tolerance (both positive and negative) – the amount by which the physical volume transferred 
varies from the contracted volume agreed upon by the traders prior to the physical transfer.  
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and crude oil differentials. As of Leaver’s publication in June of 2010, since October 2008 
traders used the Platts window only half of the time that Platts assessed Dubai (2010, 3). 
Instead of using a partials trading window, Argus assesses the price of Dubai through 
the swap markets surrounding the physical Dubai benchmark. Specifically, Argus uses the 
Dubai/Brent and Dubai intermonth swap markets to assess the price of Dubai.  
The Dubai/Brent swap is an exchange of futures for swaps (EFS): the swap enables 
traders to exchange exposure to the price of Dubai for exposure to the price of Brent futures. 
Exposure to the Brent futures price is much easier to hedge. However, the price in the EFS 
market relates to the price of Dubai loading two months forward. The EFS price is quoted as 
a differential to the Brent futures price. Once the EFS has been subtracted from the Brent 
price, the price of Dubai in two months is known.  
The Dubai intermonth swaps market enables identification of the current Dubai price. 
The spread between the price of Dubai in two months and the price of Dubai in one month 
gives the price of Dubai one month forward.  
For instance, in January, the EFS price quoted refers to the differential between the 
current Brent futures price and the price of Dubai trading in March. Argus identifies the price 
of Dubai in March by subtracting the EFS price from the price of Brent futures. The March 
forward Dubai price enables identification of the February forward Dubai price via the 
March-February swap price. After Argus identifies the February forward Dubai price, 
identification of the February-January swap leads to the January Dubai price.  
In order to assess the price of Oman, Argus uses a method similar to that of the 
method used for Dubai: identification of the price through the OTC swaps market. The 
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anticipated price of Dubai “plus the market premium or discount of Oman” identifies the 
Oman price. Conversely, Platts uses the partials method to assess Oman. Failing partials 
trading, Platts identifies the Oman price through the swaps markets.  
 Clearinghouses have opened futures trading in UAE crudes multiple times and the 
contracts have failed to gain liquidity almost as many times. An exception occurred in 2007 
when the Dubai Mercantile Exchange (DME) began offering an Omani futures contract for 
1,000 barrels of Omani crude. Much like the NYMEX Light Sweet contract, the DME Oman 
futures contract entitles the buyer to physical oil and obligates the seller to deliver physical 
oil. Much of the trading of the Oman futures contract ends in physical barrels of oil rather 
than a cash settlement, unlike the fewer deliveries for the WTI contract (Argus 2013, 13). 
 Some form of one of these three benchmark markets – Brent, WTI or Dubai-Oman – 
ultimately provides the basis for almost all crude oil that is transferred between parties. 
Researchers debate whether Dubai serves this function, since some argue it is largely 
determined by relation to the Brent markets. Regardless of the role of Oman, Brent remains 
the most important benchmark for internationally traded crude oil.  
Despite the involvement of the Brent markets, the Dubai-Oman benchmark is the 
price reference for heavier and sourer crude oils, especially those exported to Asia from the 
Middle East. Since the benchmark prices are not at parity, there is an argument to be made 
that the Dubai market represents an additional aspect not necessarily captured by the Brent 
market. According to the Handbook, the ‘Dubai’ benchmark provides a market signal for 
heavy sour crudes as well as demand for crude oil east of “the Suez Canal” (Energy 
Intelligence 2006, A36).  
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Benchmarks Summary 
 
While the North Sea and WTI benchmarks are older than the Dubai benchmark, all 
include several markets surrounding the physical oil, including financial markets, markets for 
pricing spreads, such as between a particular physical and a particular financial market, and 
physical spot markets.  
The North Sea benchmark consists of several crude oil fields and has several markets 
surrounding the physical oil, including futures, forwards and physical spot markets. The 
markets are adjusted regularly to improve liquidity and deal with production declines, which 
are natural to any one field. The North Sea market is considered the international benchmark 
as it can be used anywhere in the world to price oil, since waterborne cargos can travel to any 
part of the world. Lastly, the futures contract is the only one of the benchmark market that 
does not entitle a holder to physical crude, but the contract settles on the price established in 
the forward market, where holders are entitled to physical crude.  
The WTI benchmark is a pipeline market, and as such, WTI trades in smaller batches 
than the other waterborne markets which trade in large cargoes of 600,000bl. The 
benchmark, being located in the middle of the US is used nearly exclusively for oil produced 
and/or purchased within the US. Similar to the Brent benchmark, WTI has changed over time 
as the market context changed. For instance, as the supply of domestic production declined, 
the Cushing benchmark was adjusted to include foreign oil blended to a WTI specification. 
More recently, the Cushing benchmark is typically a blend of lighter shale production and 
heavy Canadian, blended to meet the WTI API gravity and sulfur specifications. 
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The Oman-Dubai benchmark is the newest of the three and it arose with the increase 
in oil consumption in Asian countries. Similar to the North Sea market, additional fields have 
been added to the benchmark to address liquidity issues as production naturally declines. The 
benchmark tends to be used for the sale of OPEC and other Middle Eastern crude into Asia. 
As the dissertation is focused largely on the US, WTI, followed by the North Sea market 
garner the most attention of the three possible benchmarks.  
 
The Differential 
 
Oil pricing formulas include several components, including one or more differentials 
as well as a particular construction of a reference price. The benchmark price reflects the 
value of the benchmark quality of crude oil at the benchmark pricing point of the particular 
benchmark, for instance, Cushing, Oklahoma and WTI. Differentials represent the value of a 
particular type of crude oil within the context of a particular location, relative to the context 
of the location of the benchmark crude oil.  
The differential for a particular crude oil will reflect the quality difference between it 
and the benchmark crude, but this quality premium or discount changes over time and across 
locations, as well as seasonally. Heavier and sourer crudes tend to sell at a discount to sweet 
and lighter crudes. However, if light sweet crude is more readily available in a particular area 
and area refiners are designed to process heavier quality crude, the differential for heavier 
crudes can move nearer to or rise above that for lighter ones. Conversely, if several refineries 
take units designed to process heavier crude offline during seasonal refinery maintenance, the 
premium for light sweet crude can increase beyond typical non-maintenance levels. 
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Spot market differentials respond to local conditions of the crude oil under 
consideration or to the conditions in typical outlets available to that particular crude oil. If for 
instance, a large refinery goes into an unplanned shut down, the types of crude oil typically 
consumed by the refinery output will weaken in value – the differential weakens away from 
the benchmark. If crude oil is consumed away from the area of production, the differential 
changes in relation to the conditions to typical destinations. However, local conditions can 
play a constraining role regardless of the eventual destination. If the production location 
lacks infrastructure, including access to pipelines or export terminals, the differential will 
respond by weakening relative to the benchmark price.  
 A growing differential, either an increasing discount or premium to a benchmark 
price acts as a market signal, to which market participants respond. Areas of over and under-
supply or a lack or excess of infrastructure are observed through the value of the differential. 
Responses of market participants tend to decrease the magnitude of the differential over time.  
 Differential pricing to an ‘administered’ price – the reference price – enables the 
flexibility required for the success and survival of the pricing system. Benchmark prices are 
not capable of representing the various conditions found in each individual market, but rather 
serve as a uniform starting point for a large portion of price of crude oil. The reference price 
is taken as given by the market during negotiations over the differential
31
.  
Market participants negotiate almost entirely over the value of the differential, 
significantly reducing the portion of the price involved in the discussion. If a seller or buyer 
                                                 
31
 Not only is the benchmark given, most markets already have an institutionally ingrained 
particular construction of the benchmark price to which market participants attach the 
differential.  
76 
 
become increasingly desperate, the price is likely to move against the desperate party. 
Reference pricing should increase the chance that movements away from the reference price 
remain a relatively small portion of the total price. More importantly, a localized desperate 
situation is likely to remain local rather than spill over to the ‘administered’ or uniform 
reference price by a flexible differential. 
 The differential enables the uniform pricing point achieved in the benchmark markets, 
by allowing local conditions to influence a portion of the price. If each market price were 
exactly equal to one of the benchmark prices, sellers and buyers would move away from the 
administered price as local conditions warranted, given the number and varying costs of 
producers. The use of differentials allows for this inevitability, without forcing participants to 
abandon the pricing method. The current pricing method includes an ‘administered’ price as 
well as an adjustment factor – the differential.  
 Agreed-upon differentials are largely unknown outside of the parties involved in a 
transaction, and possibly, a handful of other market participants. Price reporting agencies 
(PRAs) illuminate opaque spot markets by assessing benchmark prices as well as 
differentials for multiple crude oil markets.  
Market participants communicate the differentials at which they exchanged spot 
volumes as well as other market information, including bids, offers and perceptions of value 
to PRAs. PRAs use the information from spot market participants and their representatives to 
assess differentials for pre-defined and well-structured crude oil spot markets. Links between 
markets – both paper and physical – can also inform differentials. Every differential assessed 
by PRAs relates to a particular benchmark.  
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PRAs publish the method by which they assess various spot markets for crude oil. 
Moreover, each agency defines what they consider a legitimate trade and retains the right to 
use discretion to exclude non-representative and suspect deals.  
The methods utilized by PRAs vary for each market under examination and, 
according to Argus, aim to reflect the “unique characteristics [of the market] based on 
contractual terms, scheduling logistics, liquidity and transparency” (Argus 2012, 2). As 
market details change, so too will the price assessment for the particular market. Conversely, 
changes in the method of price assessment can lead to changes in the market details, such as 
the extension of the 21-day Brent to 25 days (Bossley Oxford Energy Forum 2012).  
Oil market participants purchase price data from PRAs, which is then inserted in the 
pricing formulas used for the exchange of crude oil via contracts – long term transfers of 
crude oil with a contract that obliges the exchanges to continue. Contracts specify the PRA(s) 
and the data series used in the pricing formula. Differentials and reference prices arising in 
spot market exchanges determine prices in contract markets. 
 
The Development of Paper Contracts  
and Electronic Trading 
 
Other commodities had traded in futures markets long before the development of oil 
futures. Since large integrated companies, followed by OPEC, administered the price of oil to 
the market, and trading oil in an open market was rare, there was little need for an oil futures 
contract.   
Parties transferring crude via contract, as well as those transacting in spot markets, 
deal with price uncertainty, which first arose in the 1970s. The eventual development of spot 
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markets brought tension to the old method of OPEC-administered pricing, and gave rise to 
increasingly active financial markets in the 1980s. 
The current pricing method ensures market negotiations begin with a similar price – 
arising from one of three reference markets. Since the determination of reference prices in 
spot markets began, reference prices change daily and are susceptible to periods of increased 
volatility. Most physical crude oil market participants engage in financial market transactions 
to reduce price uncertainty, guarantee revenue streams, increase profits or a combination 
thereof. Financial markets existed prior to spot market pricing, but the number and 
complexity of financial contracts has grown.  
The rise of resource nationalization, independent producers, exploration and 
production activity in higher-cost areas and the introduction of refinery complexity all 
increased the need for a financial market for oil (Davis 2006). From 1985, paper markets in 
the oil industry grew as oil companies looked to assure supplies and lock in prices, including 
farther in the future (Davis 2006). OPEC now looks to the forward curve to make decisions 
regarding production levels (Davis 2006). 
The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) began as a mutual society, formed by 
energy and financial firms in 1980 (Banks 2003). A gasoil contact was listed in 1980, and the 
IPE successfully launched the Brent futures contract in 1988.  
 IPE formed into a holding company in early 2000, with a goal of becoming more 
commercially oriented, including adopting electronic trading of energy futures (Banks 2003; 
Brown 2013). IPE agreed to become a subsidiary of the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in 
2001 in order to implement an electronic platform for the trading of energy futures (Banks 
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2003). ICE is exclusively an electronic exchange, originally including the following energy 
and financial firms: BP Amoco, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Royal 
Dutch Shell, Societe Generale Investment Banking and Totalfina Elf Group (McKay 2000).  
 ICE was formerly the Continental Power Exchange (CPE), an electronic platform for 
trading power (Brown 2013). CPE became ICE when the owner of CPE, Jeffery Sprecher, 
brought in a few large banks, selling them 80pc of ownership of CPE (Brown 2013). The 
banks then brought in several energy companies, turning over a portion of ownership (Brown 
2013). ICE electronic trading of gasoil and crude futures began in 2001 and by 2005, trade 
was exclusively electronic, as ICE ceased IPE floor trading (Dicker 2011, 145). 
 Energy companies started energy commodity futures contracts and other paper 
markets, and continue to support them in the present. Market participants in the Brent 
forward market continue to use Shell’s SUKO-90 contract in the forward markets. Major oil 
companies participate in financial markets and embraced the use of futures markets in place 
of physical markets for determination of the reference price of oil. As circumstances change, 
oil industry participants adjust the pricing method, and these adjustments have included 
greater reliance on financial or paper markets in the determination of the reference price of 
oil.  
OPEC countries have also embraced the financial or paper markets in the pricing of 
oil. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran replaced spot market formula prices for some destination-
markets with a futures price in 2000. The OPEC countries moved from spot price 
assessments of dated Brent with ICE BWAVE, or a volume-weighted average price 
established in the ICE Brent futures market. 
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In contrast to energy origins like IPE/ICE, the NYMEX name originated in 1882 in 
an effort to attract a broad range of customers interested in agricultural commodities, after 
being formed in 1872 as the Butter and Cheese exchange of New York  (Banks 2003, 143). 
NYMEX first launched energy contracts in 1978, beginning with heating oil, and adding the 
Light Sweet Crude contract, known as WTI, in 1983, in response to the price volatility in 
energy markets (Ibid). Although energy companies did not form NYMEX, multiple oil 
companies owned seats at the exchange from the 1980s through to the merger with CME 
(Dicker 2011, 101-104)
32
. NYMEX also moved to electronic trading, through the adoption of 
CME software in 2006
33
, although the process was drawn out, owing to the influence of and 
resistance from floor traders. 
Complex financial layers surround multiple crude and product markets. Multiple 
financial contracts relate to some form of or spread related to the three main reference crude 
oil streams: Brent, WTI and Dubai-Oman. Sellers and buyers of any of the more than 200 
types of crude oil around the world can hedge most of the price of their particular crude oil 
using the financial layers surrounding their relevant marker crude. 
In 1986, transactions of physical barrels of crude oil in the benchmark market 
determined the reference price. Presently, prices achieved in paper – financial – markets 
determine the benchmark price. As each futures contract is associated with an active physical 
spot market, moving to the financial representation of the benchmark price was a minor 
                                                 
32
 According to Dicker (2011), just before the NYMEX IPO in 2006, each of the following 
oil companies owned two or more seats on the exchange: Amerada Hess, BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, MarathonAshland, Shell, Sunoco, Total and Valero (102-104).  
33
 NYMEX offered electronic trading prior to 2006, but some contracts only traded when the 
trading floor was closed, there were a limited number and type of contracts offered, and the 
trading community did not embrace the software. 
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adjustment to the overall pricing method. Attaching differentials to one of a handful of 
cointegrated reference prices remained the dominant pricing institution.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONTEXT OF THE CRUDE OIL MARKET 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter places the latest oil price cycle within an historical context by looking at 
important but possibly ancillary issues within the oil price spike and collapse including 
petroleum products and financial investment. Demand for crude oil ultimately results from 
demand for petroleum products. Refiners are between the consumers of petroleum products 
and crude oil: crude oil serves as an input, while consumers demand the outputs. A review of 
product specifications and major changes therein as well as a brief overview of the main 
refinery units makes brings to light some of the rigidities and constraints in the physical 
market. These constraints have price impacts in both crude oil and petroleum product 
markets. The second part of the chapter addresses the development and evolution of financial 
markets related to crude oil pricing. The section looks at the commodity futures market, 
including the opening up of the market to a broader class of investors, without which the 
question of whether financial investment determines the price of oil would not be asked.  
 
Petroleum Products and Environmental Standards 
 
Crude oil varies in composition and content, including density, levels and types of 
impurities, including sulfur, acids and metals and various other qualities. There are more than 
150 different types of crude oil, according to The International Crude Oil Handbook (Energy 
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Intelligence 2006, A9), from which at any one time, may come a portion of the supply of 
crude oil. Crude oil is not a homogenous product and the characteristics that distinguish one 
stream from another are reflected in the relative prices of individual crude oils. The cost and 
value involved in refining a barrel of crude oil varies with the density, sulfur and other 
impurities of the crude oil, the capabilities of the refinery and the prices of petroleum 
products. 
The combination of increasing environmental standards since 2000, the declining 
quality of marginal barrels and inadequate investment in the refining sector led predictably to 
seasonally tight markets for particular products. The tightness in product markets potentially 
reverberates back to the crude oil market, especially given the increased liquidity in financial 
markets. 
The capabilities and capacity of refineries, the composition of the available crude 
slate and relative product prices can change the relative value of different types of crude oil 
and possibly, the price level of crude oil generally. Refinery complexity and major changes 
in fuel specifications are addressed in order to better understand the latest oil price cycle.   
Lower density (higher API value) crude oil is called light crude oil and results in a 
greater amount of lighter products through a simple refinery process, while heavier crude 
result in a greater portion of heavier, less valuable products. Sweet crudes contain relatively 
minimal sulfur, whereas sour crudes have at least .5% sulfur content
34
. Light sweet crude 
refers to low density and minimal sulfur content and it requires the least complicated and 
least costly method of transformation.  
                                                 
34
 Medium Sour has .5% to 1.5% and Sour has greater than 1.5% sulfur content (Energy 
Intelligence 2006, A99). 
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 At any given time, the type of crude oil transferred between sellers and buyers is of 
various qualities, and will likely consist of “blended crude.” Production and infrastructure 
systems, blenders and marketers blend multiple crude oils from different fields to create a 
type of crude oil that is marketed to buyers
35
. The characteristics of the particular crude will 
affect the quality and proportion of the resulting products, and the capacity utilization of the 
refinery.  
 Whether one crude oil is more valuable at any given time will depend on the prices of 
the relative products produced from the crude oil as well as the technology available to 
refineries. Refineries tend to run a particular blend of crude oil In order to utilize fully, all 
processing plants and cannot easily switch to different qualities of crude oil blends
36
, without 
sacrificing utilization of downstream plants. Similarly, producers of crude cannot change the 
quality of the crude available for sale at will, although the quality will change over the life of 
the field and varies predictably during scheduled field maintenance. 
Gross product worth is the total amount of value a refiner can obtain from a barrel of 
crude oil and this value changes with the technology of the refiner, crude quality and product 
prices. Simple refineries contain distillation units and partake in blending processes. The 
flexibility of a particular refiner or the refinery industry is constrained by the level of 
complex technology within the system.  
During atmospheric distillation, the basic unit of the refinery, molecules of similar 
composition come together and separate from dissimilar molecules. Straight-run feedstocks 
                                                 
35
 Both WTI and Brent markets refer to blended crudes.  
36
 Refiners blend various qualities of crude oil to the particular quality the plant is set up to 
process.  
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are the fractions of untreated components resulting from simple distillation. The blending 
components and process applied to each fraction will differ, owing to varying specifications, 
the impurities within the specific crude oil and refiner technology. Feedstocks range from 
light ends to heavy residuum and require further processing before they are saleable to end-
users. 
The EIA tracks refinery output among 15 different categories in the Petroleum Supply 
Monthly: LPG, finished motor gasoline
37
, finished aviation gasoline, kerosene-type jet fuel, 
kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, naphtha for petroleum feedstock use, other oils 
for petroleum feedstock use, special naphtha, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt and 
road oil, still gas and miscellaneous production (EIA 2016).  
Of all the products derived from petroleum refining, processing and blending, 
gasoline and distillate fuel oil comprise over two-thirds of output. While prices of heavier 
products are generally lower than prices of lighter products
38
, theoretically, a miss-match 
between supply and demand will cause a change in the price of a particular product and 
refineries will adjust output accordingly.  
In addition to distillation units, almost all refiners have catalytic reforming capability 
(Carollo 2012, 51). The catalytic reforming plant transforms low-octane naphtha, a straight-
run feedstock resulting from simple distillation, into a high-octane blending component for 
gasoline called reformed gasoline (Energy Intelligence 2006, A90; Carollo 2012, 52). 
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 Finished motor gasoline includes blending components, some of which do not derive from 
petroleum.  
38
 In the extreme, refiners typically sell residual fuel oil at a loss. See below for the 
introduction of coking plants that transform residual fuel oil into lighter products and 
petroleum coke.  
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Reformed gasoline requires further processing prior to qualifying as an acceptable 
component of gasoline
39
 (Carollo 2012, 52). 
Cracking plants enable the creation of lighter products out of heavy fuel oil, thereby 
increasing the gross product worth of every barrel of crude oil and reducing residuum to a 
minimum. Refiners added cracking plants because of the drastic decline in demand for heavy 
fuel oil and increase in demand for lighter products.  
Cracking also enables the refiner to vary the proportional output of the products 
produced as required seasonally
40
. Hydrocracking is preferable to catalytic cracking because 
hydrocracking enables greater flexibility regarding product proportions and “[m]ore light 
hydrocarbons are created than in cat cracking, the cracked residue is eliminated, and high-
sulfur feedstocks are desulfurized” (Energy Intelligence 2006, A90). 
Lastly, refiners with coking units are able to transform cracked and other residue 
leftover from the cracking process into lighter, more valuable products. The coking unit 
transforms residuum into lighter feedstock and a solid known as coke, which has properties 
similar to that of coal
41
.      
After minimizing residue and maximizing middle and lighter products, the fractions 
are still not saleable to end-users. Each product has legal and/or industrial standards. Further 
blending and processing is required in order for products to meet these required 
specifications.  
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 Specifically, the level of benzene and aromatics in reformed gasoline are well beyond 
current legal limits (Carollo 2012 52).  
40
 Cracking units transform heavy molecules into light and middle products. The relative 
proportions are adjusted as demand requires.  
41
 There are additional processing units that make up a modern refinery. 
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 Refineries limited to atmospheric distillation and some other simple secondary 
processing capacities are the least technologically complex and thereby the most constrained. 
The type of crude oil refined will largely determine the resulting mix of products and the 
profit margin. A complex refinery increases the proportion of light and medium 
hydrocarbons produced from a barrel of oil through the release of lighter hydrocarbons via 
the cracking of heavy carbons.  
In order to transform the supply of crude oil into the particular quantities of products 
demanded by end-users, while avoiding bottlenecks and price spikes, the refinery industry as 
a whole should be flexible and maintain excess capacity in normal times.  
The level of complexity of refiners around the world varies greatly. The more 
developed countries tend to have a greater number of complex refineries to meet stringent 
environmental specifications as well as the greater demand for lighter products (Energy 
Intelligence 2006, A92). The composition of demand for the products derived from crude oil 
differs between countries and regions.  
While less developed countries tend to demand relatively more heavy products, there 
is still variation among developed nations. For instance, the EU relies heavily on diesel for 
transportation whereas the US transportation is heavily dependent on gasoline. Diesel is 
comprised of a heavier hydrocarbon than is gasoline (diesel is within the middle distillate 
category and gasoline is a light distillate). Additionally, producing gasoline requires 
additional processes and blending that are not required in the production of diesel. 
The prices of gasoline components and distillate fuel oil move with their respective 
seasonal demand cycles. In the US, the price of gasoline peaks in the summer, while distillate 
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fuel oil peaks in the winter. Gasoline is in greater demand during the summer travel season 
while distillate fuel oil is in greater demand in the winter months for heating purposes, 
especially in the Northeastern part of the US.  
 The Clean Air Amendments of 1990 required the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to make specifications for motor fuels increasingly stringent in an effort to improve air 
quality. The changes eventually rendered ‘traditional’ refineries unequipped to produce 
gasoline out of most varieties of crude currently on the market at the time (Carrollo 2012). 
After consultation with industry, the EPA introduced the new standards over a period of 
several years with exemptions and other flexibilities over time to account for the necessary 
technological updates required of refineries.  
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required the use of higher quality gasoline in 
the geographical regions with the lowest air quality. Congress passed the Act, “requiring that 
gasoline sold in certain areas
42
 be reformulated to reduce vehicle emissions of toxic and 
ozone-forming compounds” (Federal Register 1994). Under the new standards, the properties 
of gasoline that result in emissions harmful to human health and plant life were reduced. 
As required by the 1990 amendments (40 CFR 50), the EPA sets National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), covering six ‘criteria’ pollutants, “considered harmful to 
public health and the environment” (EPA website: NAAQS homepage 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/). The pollutants are carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, 
ozone, particle pollution and sulfur dioxide (EPA website “National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards” http://epa.gov/air/criteria.html). 
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 In the most polluted metropolitans, specifically EPA-designated ozone non-attainment 
areas. 
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Geographical locations with air quality worse than the NAAQS are labeled non-
attainment areas. Non-attainment areas are required to submit state implementation plans 
(SIP) showing how the area will attain the NAAQ standards in the future. Reformulated 
gasoline is required in the areas with the worst air quality, and is optional everywhere else.  
When the Clean Air Act amendments first passed, it required nine metropolitan areas 
to provide reformulated gasoline. Including voluntary opt-in areas and non-attainment areas, 
currently “about thirty percent of the gasoline sold in the United States is reformulated” 
(EPA website Fuels and Fuel Additives: Reformulated gasoline. 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/gasolinefuels/rfg/index.htm). 
 The three major groups of emissions addressed in creation of reformulated gasoline 
through passage of the Clean Air Act amendments and subsequent fuel specification 
regulations are toxic air pollutants (TAP), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen 
oxides (𝑁𝑂𝑥). However, in the original 1990 amendments, Congress did not address nitrogen 
oxides directly: “the primary purposes of reformulated gasoline are to reduce ozone-forming 
VOC emissions during the high ozone season and emissions of toxic air pollutants during the 
entire year” (Federal Register 1990). 
  The chemical reaction of VOC and 𝑁𝑂𝑥 creates tropospheric ozone. Tropospheric 
ozone is ozone in the atmosphere within six miles of the earth (ozone beyond the 
tropospheric level, from six to thirty miles, is beneficial in filtering UV rays). ‘Ground-level’ 
or tropospheric ozone is harmful to humans, other animals and plants and it is the main 
contributor to smog.  
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The first phase of the program began at the start of 1995 and continued until the start 
of 2000. Phase I required refiners ‘reformulate’ gasoline to reduce volatile organic 
compounds (VOC) and toxics (TAP) by a minimum of fifteen percent, relative to EPA-
estimated 1990 baseline levels (Federal Register 1994).  
Adherence to the Phase I standards was possible via a simple or complex model until 
the beginning of 1998, after which, only the complex model was acceptable. During Phase II 
of the program, the reductions in harmful emissions increase beyond those of Phase I.  
The simple model identifies precise maximum allowable contents of the following: 
“Reid vapor pressure, fuel oxygen, benzene and aromatics” through establishing an estimate 
of the 1990 baseline. The maximums change from winter to summer and vary in Northern 
and Southern regions. The total content of other properties of gasoline known to be harmful 
had to be equal or less than the average content in 1990 for that particular refiner
43
 until the 
introduction of the complex model in 1998. Under the simple model, sulfur, olefins and E300 
must be no worse than the refiner’s average in 1990. 
The EPA justified the simple model because it would result in the legislated fifteen 
percent reduction in VOCs and TAPs, while also allowing refiners necessary lead-time to 
introduce technological changes, i.e., refiners producing a relatively lower quality fuel in 
1990, had an extended period to improve fuel quality (until 1998).  
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 During negotiations for Phase I, there were yet to be accurate estimates for the impact of 
sulfur, olefins and other compounds (Federal Register 1994). 
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Table 4.1 Gasoline Requirements Phase I Simple 
RVP – South 7.2 psi max 
RVP – North 8.1 psi max 
Oxygen Summer 2.0 - 2.7% 
Oxygen Winter 2.0 - 3.5% 
Heavy metals None 
sulfur Particular refiner 1990 average 
olefins Particular refiner 1990 average 
E300
44
 Particular refiner 1990 average 
“Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline; Final Rule.” (Federal Register, 1994).  
 
The 15% reduction in VOC results from the reduction in RVP and addition of oxygen 
in reformulated gasoline thereby complying with the law. Additionally, the EPA assumed the 
oxygen maximum of 2.7 and 3.5, in the summer and winter respectively, did not contribute to 
an increase in 𝑁𝑂𝑥. Of the five contributors to TAP, benzene is the only one regulated under 
the simple model (the rest are products of combustion rather than gasoline). At the time of 
the finalization of the simple model, data and models were insufficient to determine the 
quantifiable effects of all potential pollutants.  
The substantive difference between the simple and complex is the disappearance of 
the importance of the individual refiner’s average. The EPA-estimated baseline or “statutory 
baseline” replaced the refiner average when the complex model replaced the simple model on 
1 January 1998. 
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 Percent of fuel that evaporates at 300℉ 
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Table 4.2 Statutory Baseline for Complex Model   
Fuel Characteristic Summer
45
  Winter 
RVP (psi) 8.7  11.5  
Benzene (Volume %) 1.53 1.64 
Aromatics (Vl. %) 32 26.4 
Olefins (Vl. %) 9.2 11.9 
Sulfur (ppm) 339 338 
E200 (%) 41.0 50.0 
E300 (%) 83.0 83.0 
Oxygen (weight %) 0.0 0.0 
“Refiners switch to reformulated gasoline complex model.” 
Energy Information Administration. 
 
 
 
 Under the Phase I complex model properties that had yet to be quantified at the time 
of the simplified model, acquired absolute specifications. “The complex model quantifies not 
only the effects of oxygen, benzene aromatics and RVP on emissions, but also olefins, sulfur 
and the percent of fuel evaporated at 200 and 300 degrees Fahrenheit (E200 and E300 
respectively)” (EIA 1998, 2).  
 
Table 4.3 Reductions in pollutants (per gallon)
46
 
Pollutant Phase I - Simple Phase I - Complex 
TAP Emissions reduction 15% minimum 15% minimum 
NOx Emission reduction N/A Cannot increase 
VOC Emission reduction - 
Southern 
N/A 35.1% 
VOC Emission reduction - 
Northern 
N/A 15.6% 
“Refiners switch to reformulated gasoline complex model.”  
Energy Information Administration.  
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 June 1 – September 15 (June 1 – retailers; May 1 – upstream) 
46
 Standards are more strict when calculated as a refinery average 
93 
 
The EPA formulated an emission equation, with which regulators determine whether 
a particular fuel complies with the complex model standards. The EPA does not specify 
maximums for most properties
47
 since the interaction of the properties change the level and 
type of emissions.  
The EPA, in not specifying every property, provides refiners with flexibility in 
producing reformulated gasoline. For example, while RVP has the greatest impact on “the 
VOC emissions calculation,” reducing sulfur or aromatics also reduces VOC emissions. 
Additionally, “increasing E200, E300 and olefins” reduces VOC emissions as well (EIA 
2000, 18). Refiners can meet the minimum emission standards in a variety of ways.  
 Phase II (the current phase) requires the following emission reductions from the 1990 
baseline: 21.5% reduction in TAP emissions; 29% reduction in VOC emissions in the 
southern region and 27.4% in the northern region; 6.8% reduction in 𝑁𝑂𝑥 emissions during 
the summer and 1.5% in the winter (EIA 2000, 17-18). 
While the emission equation changed slightly when Phase II began, the EPA 
continued to offer refiners similar flexibility in meeting the required emissions reductions 
(EIA 2000).  
Aromatics and sulfur are the main contributors of the 𝑁𝑂𝑥 category, while aromatics, 
sulfur and benzene are the main contributors of TAP emissions. Refiners are able to reduce 
VOC emissions most effectively via reductions in RVP, reductions in sulfur and/or 
aromatics, but increases in E200, E300 and olefins may also be necessary to achieve the 
required reduction in each region (EIA 2000, 18).  
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 Oxygen still has a minimum content of 2% and benzene has a maximum of 1% per gallon 
maximum. 
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Table 4.4 Emissions reductions 
Emission type Phase I actual 
reductions (%) 
Phase II required 
reductions (%) 
TAP 18.0 21.5 
𝑁𝑂𝑥 Summer 1.5 6.8 
𝑁𝑂𝑥 Winter 1.5 1.5 
VOC South 20.8 29.0 
VOC North 10.5 27.4 
Figures from “Demand and price outlook for phase 2 reformulated gasoline, 2000.”  
Energy Information Administration. 
 
On February 10, 2000, the EPA published the final rule regarding implementation of 
the new gasoline sulfur standards (Federal Register 2000.) While finalized in early 2000, 
specified
48
 reductions in sulfur were not required until 2004, in order to enable refiners to 
acquire the latest and most cost-effective technology.  
The exceedance allowance during the year 2004, the averaging-banking and trading 
system, the geographic phase in areas and the small-refiner extensions allow refiners added 
flexibility.   
 
Table 4.5 Gasoline Sulfur Standards 
Compliance as of 2004 2005 2006 + 
Refinery Average ppm ----- 30 30 
Corporate Pool Average ppm 120 90 ----- 
Per Gallon Cap ppm 300 300 80 
“Gasoline Sulfur Standards for Refiners, Importers, and Individual Refineries.” Federal 
Register 2000, 6754. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Previous legislation indirectly led to reductions in sulfur by requiring reductions in 
emissions. 
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In 2004, an individual batch of gasoline can exceed the per-gallon cap of 300 ppm by 
up to 50 ppm. “However, in 2005, the cap for all batches will be reduced by the magnitude of 
the exceedance” (Federal Register 2000, 6754). In 2005, the per-gallon cap remains at 300 
ppm, for refiners who did not exceed the cap in 2004.  
Given that the EPA-estimated 1990-baseline gasoline had 338-9 ppm of sulfur 
content and the effect of the previously enacted emission standards of the Phase I complex 
model, many refiners likely did not feel the pressure of the new sulfur standards prior to 
2005, or possibly even 2006. According to the EPA, “…national average sulfur levels when 
both conventional and reformulated gasolines are considered dropped to 306 ppm in 1997 
and 268 ppm in 1998…” (Federal Register 2000, 6760).  
The EPA instituted the corporate average standard in 2004 and 2005 so that 
companies did not need to update all refineries simultaneously. The EPA was aware that 
some refineries would exceed the 120-ppm cap in 2004 and some would exceed the 80-ppm 
cap in 2005. However, refiners that updated facilities prior to the deadline would 
compensated for those who delayed the change. If the immediate demand for desulfurization 
technology was too large, rising prices, and possibly, material and labor shortages would 
result. 
The EPA expected the delay to be sufficient for most refiners to install 
desulfurization units. However, the final rule establishes a credit and allotment-trading 
program to allow for further delay the installations. The EPA wanted to allow “for a 
smoother transition” (6752) that enabled some refiners to wait until the beginning of 2006 
(Federal Register 2000, 6752 – 6753).  
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The final rule institutes a sulfur allotment-and-credit-trading program in another 
effort to enable technological diffusion over a longer period. In 2003, any refiner producing 
gasoline with less than 60 ppm of sulfur (annual volume-weighted average) received sulfur 
allotments to sell or use in the future. Refineries producing gasoline with less than 60 ppm 
but more than 30 ppm of sulfur received discounted allotments (20% discount).  
In 2004 and 2005, any corporation producing gasoline below the applicable standard 
of 120 in 2004 and 90 in 2005 on an annual volume-weighted average basis, receives sulfur 
allotments to use or sell to another refiner.  
 Corporations that had yet to install proper desulfurization technology at all refineries 
could purchase allotments in order to meet corporate average standards in 2004 and 2005 and 
refinery average standards in 2005. In 2005, excess allotments from 2003 and 2004 are 
discounted 50% in order to account for the increased impact of sulfur on Tier 2 vehicles in 
2005 (Federal Register 2000, 6760). Refineries could not use allotments or credits to 
circumvent the per-gallon standard.  
 In addition to other flexibilities, the final rule established a geographic phase-in area 
(GPA) to address industry concerns regarding the competition over limited resources 
required to construct and install desulphurization facilities (Federal Register 2000, 6755-56). 
Air pollution in the geographic phase-in area is of a “less urgent” concern than in other areas 
and small and rather isolated refineries supply most of the gasoline consumed with the GPA 
(Federal Register 2000, 6756).  
To allow for less competitive refiners to comply with the law while reducing the 
pressure of competition over resources prior to the compliance period, sulfur standards in the 
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GPA lagged behind requirements in the rest of the country by one year. The GPA consists of 
“Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming” as 
well as the border counties these same smaller refineries supply
49
 (Federal Register 2000, 
6756). Refineries supplying more than fifty percent of their gasoline to the GPA qualified for 
the expended deadline; i.e., were not required to adhere to the 2004-2005 corporate average 
standards of 120 and 90. 
 
Table 4.6 Gasoline Sulfur in Geographic Phase-In 
Compliance as of 2004 2005 2006 2007
50
 
Refinery Average ppm 150
51
 150 150 30 
Corporate average ppm 120 90 ----- ----- 
Per-Gallon Cap ppm 300 300 300 80 
 “Gasoline Sulfur Standards for the Geographic Phase-In Area”. 
Table from Federal Register 2000, 6758. 
 
 
According to the EPA’s analysis, small businesses supply about four percent of US 
gasoline per year. The EPA instituted a small refinery exemption in order to account for the 
disadvantaged position of a small business in raising adequate capital, and to enable smaller 
refineries to take advantage of the cost declines in desulfurization technology that the EPA 
expected to occur in the future as well as reduced pressure from competition for materials 
and labor (Federal Register 2000, 6766-6767).  
                                                 
49
 There is also a small-refiner extension available. Most small refiners in the GPA do not 
qualify for the exemption because they “are not owned by small businesses” (Federal 
Register 2000, 6756). 
50
 This column is not in the original table. 
51
 Refineries in the GPA that were already producing gasoline with a sulfur content below the 
2004 standard are held to their “1997-1998 baseline plus 30 ppm” up to 150 ppm. 
98 
 
 In order to qualify as a small refinery, the average number of employees in the 
corporation from the beginning of 1998 to the beginning of 1999 cannot exceed 1500
52
 and 
the corporation’s total refining capacity cannot exceed 155,000 barrels per calendar day 
(Federal Register 2000, 6768). The average baseline sulfur level for the years 1997 and 1998 
determine sulfur allotments for qualifying small refiners from 2004-2007. Small refiners 
must meet the national sulfur standards by January 1, 2008. Small refiners that cannot meet 
the national standards by the end of 2007 can request a hardship extension that lasts up to 
two years (Federal Register 2000, 6769).  
By 2006, the EPA required all individual refineries to produce gasoline with an 
average sulfur level of 30 ppm and instituted a per-gallon cap of no more than 80 ppm. The 
industry was aware of the standards since at least 2000, giving them six years to upgrade 
their facilities to meet the new sulfur standards.  
The EPA published a final rule outlining Tier 3 gasoline and vehicle emissions 
standards in April 2014 (Federal Register). Tier 3 standards reduce allowable levels of sulfur 
to 10 ppm, from the Tier 2 standard of 30 ppm (Federal Register 2014). By 1 January 2017, 
refiners and gasoline importers are required to supply, gasoline with a maximum of 10 ppm 
sulfur content on an average annual basis.  
Tier 3, like Tier 2 regulations, view both the vehicle and the fuel together as a system 
by enhancing the emissions control systems in vehicles and Reductions in emissions require 
a new vehicle fleet and accommodating fuel. The new motor vehicles, produced from 2017 
and beyond, require lower levels of sulfur in gasoline to protect the catalytic converter and 
                                                 
52
 Small business administration definition of a small refiner (Federal Register 2000, 6766) 
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the precious metal catalysts within it to meet emissions reductions required under Tier 3 
(Federal Register 2014, 23441-23442). Sulfur comprises the effectiveness of the catalyst in 
the catalytic converter, thereby compromising the reduction in harmful emissions. 
Additionally, a reduced sulfur level in gasoline has beneficial effects independent of the state 
of the vehicle fleet, in reduced NOx, CO and HC (total hydrocarbons) (Federal Register 2014, 
23442). 
The new Tier also includes the Averaging, Banking and Trading (ABT) credit system, 
common to previous regulation, in an effort to institute flexibility into upgrading the refining 
system. Refiners who comply with the new standards – prior to the deadline receive – credits. 
Companies can use the credits to cover other locations they have yet to upgrade or they can 
sell the credits to companies who have yet to meet the new standards. Refiners currently 
acquiring credits for producing gasoline with less than 30 ppm on an average annual basis 
(Tier 2 maximum) are able to transfer those credits to comply with the new Tier 3 system and 
refiners are able to acquire credits for the Tier 3 requirements beginning in 2014 (Federal 
Register 2014, 23419). Small refinery and hardship extensions also exist to enhance 
flexibility (Federal Register 2014, 23419). 
Beginning in 2006, diesel became what is referred to as ultra-low sulfur diesel 
(ULSD), meaning the sulfur content is 15 parts per million, or 97 percent less than prior to 
Summer 2006. As of June 2006, refiners were required to produce diesel with the 15 ppm 
maximum sulfur content, although exceptions similar to those for new gasoline regulations 
were also put into place for diesel regulations. Flexibilities included the geographical phase 
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in areas and a credit system with transferable credits that can be purchased by non-compliant 
refiners. 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the Clean Air Act by making mandatory, the 
use of renewable fuels in motor fuel. The legislation dictates the total quantity of renewable 
fuels the industry is supposed to integrate into the US motor fuel supply from 2006 to 2012, 
starting with 4 billion gallons in 2006 and increasing each following year – reaching 7.5 
billion gallons in 2012.  
The legislation requires the EPA, working with the Department of Energy, determine 
the percentage of fuel sold by refiners, blenders and importers that must be renewable, in 
order to meet the 4 billion gallon requirement in 2006 (Energy Policy Act of 2005, 477). The 
percentage is the same for all parties. If the EPA does not determine the percentage in time 
for 2006, refiners, blenders and importers are responsible for integrating renewable fuels in 
the amount of 2.78 percent of total volume of gasoline distributed in the US in 2006 (Ibid., 
477).  
The Act privileges ethanol from years 2006 through to 2012 (Ibid., 478-479), where 
integrating one gallon of ethanol into the motor fuel supply results in 2.5 gallons of 
renewable fuel credits.  
From years 2013 and beyond, the EPA, in concert with the Department of Energy and 
the Department of Agriculture, will study the issue to determine the effects of the program 
and the productive capability of the renewable fuels industry (Ibid., 477). The amount of  
renewable fuels going forward after 2012 will be approximately equal to the percentage of 
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renewable fuels in the fuel supply, given the 7.5 billion gallon requirement for 2012 Ibid., 
478). 
Small refiners are exempt from the required percentage of renewable fuels until 2011 
(Ibid., 481). The average daily operation for a refinery to be qualified as small is 75,000 b/d 
or less (Ibid., 476). The Secretary of Energy can issue extensions for a small refiner’s 
compliance if the refiner can establish “disproportionate economic hardship” would result 
from compliance (Ibid., 481). 
Credits will be given to any refiner, importer or blender who exceeds the necessary 
minimum requirement for renewable fuels (Ibid., 479). The credits can be transferred to 
another party who is deficient in renewable fuel credits and the credits are good for one year 
after the credit is generated (Ibid.). Small refiners who decide to opt in to the renewable fuels 
program also qualifies for credits (Ibid.). The production of biodiesel entitles one to 
renewable fuel credits (Ibid.). 
 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) amended the Clean Air 
Act, by adjusting the amount and types of renewable fuels for use in motor fuels – including 
gasoline, diesel and jet fuel – as well as heating oil (Energy Independence and Security Act 
2007, 28-41).  EISA also specified the annual amount of renewable fuels required through to 
2022, from the year 2012 established in The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Ibid. 31-33).   
 EISA increases the amount of renewable fuels required annually and established 
required levels of advanced biofuels, cellulosic biofuels and biodiesel. By 2012, US motor 
fuels are to include 15.2 billion gallons of renewable fuel, compared to the 7.5 billion 
required by The Energy Policy Act of 2005. Every year the required amount of renewable 
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fuel increases, ultimately reaching 36 billion gallons in 2022. However, the 2007 legislation 
includes all motor fuel, while that from 2005 referred only to gasoline (Ibid., 33). 
 EISA continues the method previous legislation included, legislating absolute 
amounts of renewable fuels, rather than percentages of total fuel consumed. The 
administrator of the EIA provides an estimate of motor fuel consumption for the following 
year to the administrator of the EPA, who then determines the applicable percentage required 
to meet the legislated amount of biofuel.   
 These absolute quantities of renewable fuels have raised concerns of a potential 
“blend wall”. A blend wall occurs when fuel demand growth is insufficient to meet the 
legislated amounts of renewable fuels, i.e., overall, vehicles are not able to use fuel with a 
renewable content as high as would be required to use the legislated quantity. 
 
Commodities as a Financial Asset 
 
Robert Greer was the first to suggest the potential of commodities as an asset class, 
in, in “Conservative commodities: A key inflation hedge,” (1978).  Commodities held as an 
asset provided inflation protection. The correct mix of commodities, stocks and debt is 
potentially a better portfolio than one without commodities, since the former contains an 
inflation hedge (Greer 1978, 26).  
The inflation-hedged portfolio is more likely to provide stable real returns than a 
portfolio without commodity futures (Greer 1978, 27-28). However, during times of low 
inflation, the rate of return on alternative assets is higher (Greer 1978, 26).  
While Greer introduced the idea in 1978, legal hurdles and technical complexities 
served as obstacles to commodity futures gaining in popularity as a new class of financial 
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assets. Decades passed before institutional investors began viewing commodity futures as an 
asset class. Until 1994, the Prudent Man Rule prevented institutional investors from investing 
in commodities because they were too risky.  
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act – approved in 1994 – replaced the Prudent Man 
rule, and by 2004, 41 states had replaced the Prudent Man Rule with the Prudent Investor 
Act. Under the new governance rules, the riskiness of the portfolio is examined as one unit, 
rather than examining an asses in isolation. Under the 1994 Act, an individual asset is within 
or one part of a complete portfolio. 
Upon the removal of legal restrictions, commodity investments arose as an option for 
diversifying returns so that the portfolio does not suffer or stagnate when stocks and bonds 
are performing poorly. The lack of correlation to traditional investments made commodity-
investing look increasingly attractive during periods of low returns, including post-crises.  
Commodity futures are one form of ‘alternative’ investment strategies where returns 
are ‘ideally’ uncorrelated with stocks and bonds. Typically investors do not have the time nor 
technical knowledge to participate in futures markets, so they turn over a portion of their 
portfolio to a person or institution that invests in futures markets on their behalf. 
Individuals who advise and invest client funds in futures markets must register with 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the National Futures Association 
(NFA) as a commodity trade advisor (CTA).  
In order to diversify beyond the skills of a single CTA, investors may also pool funds 
under a commodity pool operator who hires a variety of CTAs to manage the pool. 
Commodity pool operators (CPO) must also register with the CFTC and NFA. Registering 
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the fund with the CFTC and the NFA requires supplying various documents related to the 
investments, strategies and risks involved in the fund on at least an annual basis.  
From 2003 until 2013, most hedge funds and other forms of private investment funds 
investing in futures and other derivative markets were exempt from registration under CFTC 
Rule 4.13(a)(4). Private funds consisting exclusively of investments from clients that are 
considered sophisticated investors were exempt from registration. Exempted investors 
included managers of pension, insurance and other funds.  
The CFTC rescinded rule 4.13(a)(4) following the passage of The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The rule change was to help identify threats to 
the financial stability of the United States as stated in the Dodd-Frank legislation. 
Beginning in 2013, the exemptions reverted to the pre-2003 rule. If the fund is not 
primarily invested in speculative futures and OTC derivatives contracts; i.e., if the find 
“engaged in a de minimis amount of derivatives trading,” and consists only of qualified 
exempt persons it will remain exempt from registration (CFTC 17 CFR Parts 4, 145, and 147, 
9).  
If either the total net investment in futures is not leveraged beyond the value of the 
liquidated portfolio or the initial margin and premiums do not exceed five percent of the 
liquidated portfolio, and all clients are considered qualified exempt persons, the fund may 
still qualify for exemption from CFTC and NFA registration, under the rule 4.13(a)(3).  
Commodity index investments consist of long-only futures positions, i.e., index 
investors only participate on the buy side of the futures market. Passive investors are looking 
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for exposure to the prices of commodities over the long term, which leads them to purchase 
long-only futures and regularly roll over the contracts prior to expiry. 
As far as the potential for undesirable effects, some researchers postulate that 
inattention to prices by passive investors distorts price discovery in the futures market 
(Masters and White 2008). Opponents to the method of Passive or “index” investing argue 
against the long-only aspect of the method.  
A less direct form of investment in commodity prices entails investing in the equities 
of companies heavily involved in commodity production. However, there are other risks 
associated with this sort of indirect investment, such as “corporate management risk and 
general market risk” and, most importantly, the performance of commodity-related equities is 
less related to the price of commodities than it is to the S&P 500 (Englke and Yuen 2008, 
566). Commodity futures markets represent the most direct form of financial investment into 
commodities, without taking possession of physical commodities.    
Goldman Sachs and Dow Jones-UBS operated popular commodity indices during the 
price rise. According to the Goldman manual, the GSCI is composed of “commodities that 
are the subject of production or distribution processes in the world economy and that have a 
direct effect on price levels and inflation” (GSCI Manual 2004, 15).  
The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index was created in 1991 and weighted each 
commodity by total world production over the past five years, while the volume of futures 
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contracts traded determined which commodities would be included in the index
53
 (GSCI 
2011, 25-28).  
In 2009, the DJ-UBS Commodity Index replaced the DJ-AIG Commodity Index. AIG 
launched the DJ-AIG in 1998 (DJ-UBS 2012, 1). Liquidity in futures markets determines 
which commodities are included in the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index.  
Liquidity and production data determined the weights
54
 given to each commodity 
included in the DJ-UBS index. Within the DJ-UBS index, a single sector could not comprise 
more than 33 or less than 2 percent of the index (DJ-UBS 2012, 2). This maximum in the DJ-
UBS index leads to the biggest difference between the two indices, where Goldman gives 
greater weight to energy-related commodity futures.  
Replicating a commodity index, like investing in other indices, enables investors to 
gain exposure to a large variety of assets through a single investment. Unlike traditional 
indices, the commodities indices are based on the prices of contracts that expire every month. 
Therefore, the replication of returns requires regularly ‘rolling over’ contracts prior to 
expiration.  
                                                 
53
 The calculation requires additional steps as futures contracts for individual commodities 
are not necessarily comparable – consider a single contract representing 1000 barrels of 
sweet light crude compared to a contract representing cattle. (See GSCI Methodology 2004, 
26). 
54
 Calculations for total world production and contracts traded include the past five years in 
an attempt to smooth temporary trends. 
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The number of each futures contract in the index changes as the relative prices of the 
futures contracts change
55
. When relative prices change, commodity portfolios must be 
“rebalanced” according to pre-determined weights given to each commodity.  
Given the complexity of commodity-index investing, index investors turn over a pre-
determined allocation of funds to “swap dealers” or money managers who provide the 
returns/assess the losses resulting from changes in commodity futures prices. Investors are 
thereby able to gain price exposure to physical commodity price movements in proportions 
represented by world production and liquidity, without dealing with the process involved in 
monthly rollovers.  
The pre-determined allocation is the percentage of the total portfolio invested in 
commodities for the purpose of diversification. As the size of the total portfolio changes, so 
too does the dollar-amount invested in commodity futures.  
Financial institutions, on behalf of their clients, will sell the near-month contracts 
prior to expiration, and replace them with a contract that expires the following month
56
. 
Every index has a specified method governing the ‘roll’ process. The method stipulated by 
those in charge of the index governs the replacement of contracts near expiry.  
During a specified time of month, a specified percentage of the contracts are sold 
each successive day until there are no more contracts near expiration. While those in charge 
                                                 
55
 According to Verleger, it is precisely this reason that index investors can stabilize rather 
than exaggerate runaway prices.  
56
 The original indices were based on second-month futures contracts. However, beginning in 
2006 several ‘second-generation’ indices began to use contracts that expired several months 
out. This development increased the demand for far-away contracts relative to near-month 
contracts. Given the illiquidity of far-month futures contracts, passive investors will make up 
a greater portion of that market (Wheat 2009, 94; 103-104). 
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of valuing the commodity index never actually purchase and sell contracts, the accepted 
methodology governs their calculations of the prices that would result if they did trade the 
contracts according to the accepted methodology.  
Commodity indices result in an increased demand for futures contracts because the 
financial institutions hedge their own exposure. The funds replicate the commodity index for 
investors, and they purchase commodity futures to hedge their own risk created by 
replicating the indices for their clients. The money managers probably only purchase 
contracts related to net exposure, which results from the particular composition of his clients, 
rather than purchase all contracts for every client. 
Investors potentially earn three returns from investing in commodity indices: ‘spot’, 
roll and collateral returns. ‘Spot’ returns result from changes in the prices of commodities 
futures included in the commodity index: an increase/decrease in the price 
increases/decreases the value of the index. A roll return is the difference between the price of 
the near-month futures contract at the time of sale and the price of the futures contract that 
replaces it. A contango market causes a negative roll return and in a backwardated market, 
the roll return is positive
57
. Lastly, the collateral return is the return obtained from the interest 
earned on the collateral of the client.  
If a pension funds wants to gain exposure to commodities worth one million dollars, 
the fund manager turns over the full sum to a swap dealer. The swap dealer then invests the 
collateral in a low-risk, low-return investment, such as Treasury Bills. The interest earned on 
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 The roll return in a contango market is precisely the reason for the development of second-
generation indices, wherein the roll period and the replacement contract are much more 
flexible in order to enable maximum returns (Wheat 2009, 103). 
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the treasuries is the collateral return. The dealer need not invest the full sum because futures 
contracts are purchased on margin. Second, the dealers have multiple clients, whose diverse 
trades act as a natural hedge for the exposure of the dealer. All major commodity indices 
include at least the spot and roll return, others include the collateral return as well (Wheat 
2009, 89). 
The long-only aspect of index investors raises concerns regarding their possible 
contributions to rising crude oil prices. The motives of traditional futures market traders and 
active commodity investors lead them to purchase both long and short futures contracts. 
Rather than provide liquidity to both sides of the market, index investors potentially siphon 
liquidity away from traditional hedgers
58
 and speculators, by engaging only the buy side of 
the market.  
Concerns about index investors relate to liquidity, ignorance of market signals and an 
initial run-up in prices when index investing rose in popularity. In contrast, managed futures 
participate in both sides of the market, so the issues related to commodities as an asset class 
change. 
Technical Trading 
 
Systemic, also called trend-based trading, guides the majority of active investment in 
futures markets, although alternate strategies are growing in popularity (Abrams, et al. 2010, 
5; Barclay Hedge). 
                                                 
58
 “Traditional” distinguishes physical from financial hedgers. Financial hedgers purchase 
futures contracts as a hedge against some other financial position. Physical hedgers are 
involved in the specific physical commodity represented as a financial asset in the futures 
market. Prior to September 14, 1987, the CFTC did not consider financial hedgers as bona 
fide hedgers (CFTC 2008). As hedgers, financial players are not subjected to position limits; 
they are however, subjected to other constraints (see p. 15). 
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Technical trading enables traders to profit by participating in a trend or pattern, once 
identified, using an understanding of typical patterns and tools to identify these patterns. 
Empirical data, along with the tendency of patterns to repeat, aid in the identification of 
trends and associated patterns. 
Systemic or technical strategies can be contrasted with fundamental analysis, where 
traders look to market context, but fundamental traders also look to technical analysis, at 
least to time changes in positions. Fundamental trading involves an understanding of a 
particular market, or of macroeconomics and macroeconomic effects on a particular market 
or group of markets. It is likely many fund managers utilize both fundamental and technical 
data while deciding investment strategies. 
Empirical analysis of technical signals allows trading without being captive to the 
typical human psychological tendencies and emotions that determine the identified and 
repeated patters. Whereas investors operate via human tendencies, technical traders identify 
and predict the price changes driven by such motivations. Because human psyche drives the 
patterns, they tend to repeat across time and markets. 
Resistance levels identify a ceiling, beyond which the price has not been lately or 
ever. Levels of support, or support prices are a floor below which the price has not fallen 
recently. Lines of support and resistance help traders identify when a trend begins. 
A horizontal line drawn on a chart connecting the last string of high prices identifies 
the resistance level or ceiling. A horizontal line connecting a string of low prices shows the 
level of support, or floor. The lines connect at least two points and are not to cross over any 
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price activity. A price breaking through a level of resistance or support may indicate an 
uptrend or downtrend, respectively 
Resistance and support lines are diagonal rather than horizontal in markets trending 
higher or lower. In a bullish market, the trend line will connect the low prices and the more 
points that touch the line, the greater the likelihood of a stronger trend. In a bearish market, 
the line connects the price peaks.  
When the price moves beyond the line, the trend may be changing. Traders have 
different rules to guide their trading, but to avoid the pitfalls of human emotion, strict rules 
govern most technical trading. (Technical Analysis 2010). 
The faster a trader identifies a trend, the more profit potential the trend carries. The 
faster a trader identifies a break in the trend, the lesser the loss of the profit so far gained, 
before cashing out of the position.  
Moving averages crossovers provide another tool for the identification of a break in 
trend. However, the moving average lags the price movement and therefore provides a 
delayed signal of a new trend.  
The moving average is plotted on the same chart as the price series and when the 
price series “crosses over” the moving average, a change in trend has occurred. The 
identification is further strengthened when the moving average line begins to move in the 
same direction as the price series (Technical Analysis 2010). In gaining further support for 
trend changes, technical analysts will include multiple moving averages of varying periods in 
addition to the price series. A trend is reinforced when a shorter-term moving average crosses 
over a longer-term moving average.  
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Momentum indicators are used in combination with moving averages, owing to the 
lag of the latter (Technical Analysis 2010). Momentum indicators measure the change in 
prices over time, rather than the absolute price. The greater the magnitude of the change in 
price, the stronger the trend indicated. As the trend begins to change, the rate of change tends 
to decrease prior to reversing, aiding in the identification of a break with the current trend.  
Technical analysis provides traders with signals and ways to try to recognize a trend 
early. Other ideas have developed that aid traders in predicting the direction of price 
movements, including Elliott Wave Theory Elliot wave and Fibonacci Numbers (Technical 
Analysis 2010). 
The increase of financial investment in commodity futures may have overrode the 
influence of traditional speculators. Newer entrants in the oil futures market, those using 
technical trading techniques, may have changed the relevant variables by relying on a 
different range of data (Mabro 2001) and historical trends (Carollo 2012).  
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CHAPTER 5 
AN APPLICATION OF THE PRICING METHOD: 
 THE US GULF COAST 
 
 
 
Introduction 
For much of the history of the oil industry, the US Gulf coast has been at the center of 
US oil markets. The US Gulf coast represents the largest refining center in the United States, 
and remains a major hub for US crude imports, petroleum product exports and more recently, 
rising crude oil exports. 
 This chapter examines the price cycle from the start of the current century through 
early 2016, including the path of differentials for one light sweet and one medium sour grade 
of crude oil at the US Gulf coast, within the framework laid out in chapter three. The chapter 
takes from chapters two and four, the context of the physical market and the multiple 
possible causes of drastically changing prices form the early 2000s through to the peak in 
2008 and the collapse thereafter. 
Market participants established the pricing method within a specific historical context 
and they adjust the method as the context changed over time. One such adjustment, 
introduced and accepted by market participants, has been the use of financial markets in the 
pricing of physical oil. The analysis shows how the pricing method grounds the price of oil to 
conditions in physical oil markets, despite the potential of financial conditions to determine 
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futures markets prices in the short term or exaggerate price movement caused by conditions 
in the physical market. Moreover, participants in the physical oil market respond to prices 
determined in financial markets. 
The current method of pricing arose within conditions of oversupply following high 
and rising prices through the 1970s, and so far remains intact and appears appropriate for the 
current situation – one of oversupply following the high and rising prices for much of the 
twenty-first century. While interested parties adjusted the pricing method regularly, since its 
formation in 1980s, the basic structure remains. Reference prices and differentials comprise 
the price of physical oil and prices in spot markets still determine those in contract markets.  
  
Pricing at the US Gulf Coast 
 
The most commonly known crude oil, of the domestic grades at the US Gulf coast, is 
Light Louisiana Sweet (LLS), possibly followed by Mars. The values of these two crude oils 
represent the particular grade of crude oil at their respective pipeline delivery points. LLS 
represents the value of light sweet crude at the US Gulf coast, particularly, St. James, 
Louisiana. Mars represents the value of medium sour crude at the US gulf coast, explicitly, 
Clovelly, Louisiana.  
The values of both higher quality light, sweet crude as well as heavier sourer crude 
are central to the price cycle, as through to 2010 the oil slate was expected to become 
increasingly heavier and sourer, while legal specifications for petroleum products became 
increasingly stringent. These two trends were expected to continue indefinitely. Following 
the onslaught of shale production, the crude oil slate became increasingly lighter as US shale 
production is almost entirely light crude oil.     
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Most transactions of LLS consist of various crude oils blended to a strict 
specification, i.e., a mix of crude oil of varying quality, originating from multiple 
fields/locations, blended in proportions that result in the specifications that define LLS
59
. The 
Capline pipeline, which originates in St. James, sets the specifications for LLS. Specifically, 
the specification is for LLS that will go into the Capline pipeline at St. James, Louisiana. The 
storage and pipeline transport facilities at the St. James hub have also incorporated the same 
specification, meaning buyers purchasing LLS at St. James expect the quality to adhere to the 
Capline LLS specification, regardless of whether the volumes actually go into the Capline 
pipeline. 
In contrast to LLS, Mars is a blend of offshore field production exclusively, that 
travels ashore as Mars blend.  A handful of majors and independent producers own the 
several offshore production fields that makes up the Mars blend. There is not active blending 
of other crude oil to the Mars specification, sold as Mars, in contrast to the blending that is 
common to the LLS market, where the origin of the crude oil blended into LLS is unknown. 
WTI is the reference price to which the differentials for LLS and Mars refer. The 
differentials for LLS and Mars represent the market context at the specific pricing location, 
relative to the context for WTI at Cushing, Oklahoma. The physical market surrounding LLS 
and Mars determines the differentials for LLS and Mars. 
The quality of LLS and WTI are similar as they are both light sweet crude oil, relative 
to Mars, a heavier sourer crude. Owing to the similar quality of LLS and WTI, much of the 
                                                 
59
 Most crude oil is a blend consisting of production from multiple oil fields. Moreover, 
refiners tend to purchase multiple varieties of these blended crude oil streams and engage in 
extensive blending prior to processing crude oil. 
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differential for LLS represents the difference in value between Cushing, Oklahoma and the 
Louisiana coast, specifically, St. James. The differential for Mars includes both the locational 
disparity and the discount typically incurred by a relatively lower quality crude oil.  
LLS, Mars and WTI are pipeline-delivered crude oil. Crude originating both on and 
offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as imports, tends to travel throughout the US via an 
extensive network of pipelines, although the shale boom has increased the use of rail, barges 
and trucks. Pipeline crude oil markets, like waterborne markets, trade ahead of delivery. 
The delivery of pipeline crude oil tends to take place over the entire month. The buyer 
arranges to accept say, 5,000 barrels per calendar day (5,000 b/d). Scheduling for crude oil 
deliveries for the following month is finalized no later than the 25
th
 of the prior month, which 
is also the final session of the pipeline trade month.  
The pipeline trade month runs from the 26
th
 of each month to the 25
th
 of the next 
month.  The market rolls to the following traced month on the 26
th
, two months prior to the 
delivery month. The December trade month begins on 26 October, or the following business 
day, and continues until 25 November, or the prior business day. 
The CME’s light sweet futures contract – WTI – outlined in chapter three, 
synchronizes with the pipeline trade month, as the details of the Cushing, Oklahoma pipeline 
hub informed the CME futures contract. The futures contract rolls forward to a new prompt 
trade month three days prior to expiration of the pipeline month. Delivery schedules are 
finalized for the following month – the delivery month – during the final three days of the 
pipeline trade month. In the final scheduling days, prices tend to be more volatile as market 
participants square up final monthly totals. As these days are known to be volatile, traders 
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will tend to secure or sell volumes before these final sessions. This illiquidity then likely 
contributes to the volatility.  
While trade for LLS and Mars may occur following the trade month deadline, PRAs 
exclude such trades as they are likely distressed and are thereby not representative of the 
market. Trade in ultra-spot markets – trade that takes place following the end trade month – 
however, can influence values in the current trade month if the volumes are substantial. 
Spot negotiations over the differentials for actively traded pipeline grades occur 
throughout each trading session. PRAs calculate or assess differentials daily. The trade 
month average consists of an average of approximately 21-23 daily differentials.  
Buyers and sellers in the spot market for domestic crude oil at the coast negotiate 
over the value of, say, Mars, relative to the US benchmark, ‘WTI’. Spot market participants 
are more concerned with the value of the differential, than with the outright price of the crude 
oil.  
In most LLS and Mars spot market trades, as with other established domestic pipeline 
grades, traders exchange WTI, the LLS or Mars as well as the value of the differential. The 
money exchanged in spot market transactions relates exclusively to the differential to WTI. 
For example, in a typical LLS spot market transaction, alongside the transfer of LLS, parties 
also transfer WTI. A seller of 1,000 b/d of LLS receives the value of the negotiated 
differential for LLS
60
 to WTI, say $3/bl, as well as an equivalent quantity of WTI. The buyer 
of the LLS receives the LLS, provides the seller with the value of the differential for LLS as 
well as 1,000 b/d of WTI, delivered at Cushing, Oklahoma.  
                                                 
60
 LLS typically trades at a premium to WTI, i.e., a positive differential. 
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Outright prices, as opposed to differentials, marked at the time of an agreement to 
trade are likely to be different from the price the buyer paid or the revenue the seller 
received. The discrepancy results from a constantly changing price of WTI. The prices 
marked at the time of the agreement of the LLS transaction use the current price of WTI, 
whereas the WTI exchanged in the spot trade was likely acquired at a different time, and 
therefore, at a different price. Many market participants hedge their WTI exposure in the 
futures market, adding another layer of complexity to the price or cost construction, as the 
hedge should offset changes in the value of the physical position of the hedger.  
Market participants may exchange physical WTI or futures contracts in spot trade. 
However, the level of margin required by futures exchanges tends to make physical WTI 
more attractive. Counterparties with established relationships are likely to provide better 
terms of credit than those required by the CME and ICE.  
The WTI exchange ensures the differential is the sole point of negotiation in spot 
trade, and therefore represents the relative market value of the crude to WTI. PRAs 
disseminate these differentials, which are then included in the pricing formulas for long-term 
contracts. For instance, the trade month average of the differential for LLS is typically 
included in the pricing formula for transfers of light sweet crude oil at the US Gulf coast, 
including in contracted transfers of LLS itself. The contract specifies which PRA will be 
used as each is unlikely to have exactly the same value, depending on the various PRA 
methodologies and information received from the market. 
The WTI CMA is the dominant reference price in contracted transfers of domestic 
crude oil, although the postings-plus price remains common in the midcontinent (Fielden 
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2012) and posted prices are common at the wellhead. The posted-plus price includes the cost 
of transporting the WTI to Cushing, Oklahoma, and since at least 2006, the posting accounts 
for the structure of the forward curve (Argus Media 2006). The ‘plus’ or differential to the 
posted price arises through spot transactions of WTI, using the posted price as the reference 
price. The differential, or the ‘plus’ and the posting is the WTI postings-plus, which is used 
in contracted transfers of crude oil.  
The Koch posting served as a common reference price up to mid-2006, and existed 
ten years prior to the NYMEX light sweet futures contract (Argus Media 2006). The Koch 
WTI posting was the price Koch was willing to pay for crude at the wellhead, in West Texas 
and New Mexico (Fielden 2012). After Koch cancelled their WTI posting in mid-2006, the 
ConocoPhillips posting became the next commonly utilized posting, followed by the Phillips 
66 posting, after Conoco and Phillips split into two companies. 
While the WTI CMA serves as the most common contract reference price, the 
Phillips 66 posting follows a similar pattern. The Phillips 66 monthly posting will be the 
same as the WTI CMA minus $3.38/bl.  Since April 2008, Phillips 66 sets the posting at a 
discount of $3.38/bl to the NYMEX settlement price (Fielden 2012). Much of the liquidity 
for physical WTI in the spot market has moved to the CMA-related market, although PRAs 
still cover the postings-plus WTI spot market. 
The WTI cash market was another market for physical WTI, popular before the rise 
of WTI CMA. After the NYMEX settled, traders would buy and sell physical WTI at a 
differential to that day’s settlement price. As electronic trading took off, this cash market 
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became illiquid and PRAs ceased coverage owing to illiquidity. That is, market participants 
moved to the electronic trading from OTC aftermarket trading.  
 Currently, some form of the NYMEX settlement price serves as the reference price of 
most physically traded WTI, and most domestic transfers of other grades of crude oil. WTI 
tends to be exchanged via the WTI CMA, the WTI postings price or sometimes even a single 
session’s NYMEX settlement price. The futures market price, albeit typically adjusted, is the 
price of physical oil, both WTI-type oil and other grades as well. 
The contract price of non-WTI domestic crude tends to  include the WTI CMA price, 
and most likely, a ‘roll’ adjustment61, a trade month differential and lastly, a custom 
differential to the formula price
62
.    
The NYMEX light sweet futures settlement price is also included in some imports of 
foreign crude oil, including those from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. Rather than turn away 
from the futures market, oil companies embraced the increased liquidity in the market. 
 
The Path of the Benchmark Price (WTI) 
 
Following the 1986 decision by Saudi Arabia to regain market share by adopting 
netback prices, non-OPEC oil production began to fall, for the first time since at least 1966
63
. 
Non-OPEC production was steady in 1988 and fell each year from 1989 through to 1993, 
                                                 
61
 See chapter three for a description of the WTI cash roll. The traded market for WTI 
differential to NYMEX CMA is also used as a ‘roll’ adjustment in contracts (described in 
chapter three) although the values are likely to be similar. 
62
 A typical contract pricing formula also includes a ‘custom’ discount or premium in 
addition to the reference price and the differential determined in spot trade (for grades other 
than WTI) (Fielden 2012). 
63
 The yearly average increase in non-OPEC oil production was, on average, 1.186mn b/d 
from 1966 through 1985, with 1985 seeing the smallest increase at 427,000 b/d (BP 2015).  
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with annual declines averaging 527,200 b/d over the period. The physical market responded 
to the lower price level. There exists, however, a lag between production levels changing and 
decisions regarding production.   
Near the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the daily price tended to settle 
within $20/bl and $25/bl, aside from a temporary spike at the start of the first Iraq war. From 
1993, the price tended to remain between $15/bl to $20/bl until the Asian financial crisis of 
1997, during which prices fell to the low teens. Non-OPEC oil production responded, rising 
by a mere 113,000 b/d in 1998 and falling by 80,000 b/d in 1999, while yearly OPEC 
production did not fall until 1999. 
The price of oil was recovering in 1999, with OPEC agreeing to production cuts in 
both 1998 and 1999, and, in 2000 OPEC adopted a price band (Fattouh 2007). Through 1999, 
the WTI price consistently increased. The minimum price hit in 2000 was greater than the 
average price in 1999 by $4.55/bl, illustrating a continuation of the uptrend that began in 
1999.  
WTI futures prices sustained a relatively higher range in the upper $20s/bl and lower 
$30s/bl, until the US recession and the attack on 11 September 2001 temporarily constrained 
the uptrend. Following September 11, prices dropped, bottoming out at slightly under $20/bl 
(see Figure 5.1 on following page).  
By 2003, the price of WTI returned to levels not seen since before the events of 2001. 
The average price of WTI in 2003, around $31/bl, was slightly more than the average of 
$30.27/bl in 2000.  
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Figure 5.1 Price of Oil 1990-2001. NYMEX Light Sweet month 1 contract daily settlement price per barrel 
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Figure 5.2 Price of Oil 2002-2007. NYMEX Light Sweet month 1 contract daily settlement price per barrel 
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The uptrend continued in 2004 with the average price higher by more than $10/bl, 
compared to the 2003 average. In 2005, the average price rises by $15/bl, followed by 
increases of $10/bl in 2006 and nearly $6/bl in 2007 (see figure 5.2).  
WTI futures prices strengthened and, while choppy at times steadily increased, with 
the second half of 2006 marking the only notable period during which prices did not trend 
stronger. The price fell from the low $70s/bl to the mid $50s/bl, although prices recovered 
and strengthened further by the spring of 2007 (figures 5.2-3). The following year, the 
average price soars to nearly $100/bl, an increase of more than $25/bl from the 2007 average.  
OPEC production increased at an average of 2.354mn b/d while non-OPEC 
production increased by an average of 386,000 b/d (see figure 5.3) from 2003 through 2005 
(BP 2015). Non-OPEC production does not appear to have responded significantly to the 
rising prices of the period.  
Much of the overall slow growth rates in non-OPEC production resulted from the 
contributions made by declining production in mature fields in OECD countries (BP 2015). 
In 2007, US production was lower by 503,000 b/d compared to 2003, while production in the 
UK and Norway combined was lower by 1.35mn b/d (BP 2015). These locations represent 
the US and international benchmarks, WTI and Brent, respectively.  
OPEC production grew by a little more than 300,000 b/d in 2006 and fell by slightly 
more than that in the following year, while non-OPEC supply increases by slightly less than 
135,000 b/d in both 2006 and 2007 (BP 2015).  
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Figure 5.3 Change in World Oil Supply less change in OPEC Oil Supply. BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2015 Annual data (author calculation) 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Change in Oil Supply less change in Oil-Product Consumption. BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2015 Annual data (author calculation) 
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Oil product consumption increased by a little more than 900,000 b/d while production 
increased by just over 450,000 b/d in 2006 (BP 2015). By 2007 the gap widens, with demand 
rising by 1.4mn b/d and world supply falling by just over 195,000 b/d (BP 2015). 
Consumption of oil products increased by an annual average of 1.65mn b/d from 2003 
through 2007, with 2004 seeing the largest jump, at 2.845mn b/d (BP 2015). The yearly 
average increase for China and India were 511,000 b/d and 105,000 b/d, respectively (BP 
2015). Consumption was on the rise in 2006 and 2007, but production was not responding 
(see figure 5.4). 
In the late summer of 2007, the price for WTI begins to recede, as is typical when the 
US gasoline season closes. Unexpectedly, the price moves higher soon after, rising well over 
highs established during the peak US driving season, and continues increasing through much 
of the remainder of 2007. 
Deliveries into the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) began in September 2007, 
with reserve stocks higher by 6mn bl by year’s end (EIA weekly SPR inventory data). The 
gap between the increase in consumption and the increase in production occurring in 2007 as 
well as SPR deliveries likely helped sustain higher prices through the end of 2008. However, 
there were additional factors to consider. 
In August 2007, the Federal Reserve started to reduce the Federal Funds Rate, with 
the effective rate moving weaker by 25 basis points per month, from August 2007 through 
January 2008, exempting September (Federal Reserve Economic Data Monthly Effective 
Federal Funds rate). December’s effective rate was about 4.25pc, from July’s 5.25pc (Ibid.). 
The rate decreases likely exasperated previously existing concerns over the weakening dollar.  
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The price of WTI in the futures market receded somewhat by early February, falling 
to less than $90/bl but prices quickly recovered hitting nearly $102/bl by February’s end. The 
Federal Funds rate was lowered by almost 100 basis points from January, with February’s 
effective rate just below 3pc (Ibid.). The effective rate held was reduced until May, after 
which it was held at 2pc through August (Ibid.). From September it was weakened, reaching 
nearly zero percent by year’s end (Ibid.).  
From late February, the price begins the ascent to the July peak of $145/bl, which 
lasts for two sessions. From July through the rest of 2008, the price collapses to the low 
$30s/bl as the financial crisis and accompanying recession emerge. The one exception to the 
price decline occurs in September, likely owing to an active hurricane season. However, the 
Department of Energy began draining the Strategic Reserve, in response to shut-in 
production and the price begins to descend, once again. The price of WTI futures bottomed 
out at $33.87/bl on 19 December.  
It is very likely fears of inflation and a credit crunch influenced prices on the way to 
July’s peak and December’s bottom, respectively. The final ascent to the record high, 
established mid-year 2008 does appear to be influenced by financial interest in commodity 
futures. Both the peak and the bottom are not sustained, and arguably, neither were 
sustainable. 
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Figure 5.5 WTI and Trade Weighted Dollar Index 2003-2008 (daily). Energy Information 
Administration and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) NYMEX WTI month 1 contract 
daily settlement per barrel and Trade Weighted Dollar Index 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 WTI and Trade Weighted Dollar Index 2003-2008 (annual). Energy Information 
Administration and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) NYMEX WTI month 1 contract 
daily settlement per barrel and Trade Weighted Dollar Index annual average 
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Figure 5.7 WTI 2008 Peak and Crash. NYMEX WTI month 1 contract daily settlement price 
per barrel 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 WTI Price 2000-2008 
Year Min Max Average 
2000 23.85 37.20 30.27 
2001 17.45 32.19 25.95 
2002 17.97 32.72 26.15 
2003 25.24 37.83 31.00 
2004 32.48 43.45 41.47 
2005 42.12 69.81 56.69 
2006 55.81 77.03 66.28 
2007 50.48 98.18 72.41 
2008 33.87 145.29 99.75 
NYMEX WTI month 1 contract daily settlement price per barrel 
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Figure 5.8 Timeline of Crude Oil Price 2003-2008. NYMEX WTI Month 1 contract daily settlement price per barrel 
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Table 5.2 Change in Oil Supply and Oil Product Demand  
Year Δ oil 
consumption 
Δ non-OECD 
consumption 
Δ China oil 
consumption 
Δ oil supply Δ OPEC oil 
supply 
Δ supply less 
Δ OPEC 
2000 619 586 314 2632 1457 1175 
2001 722 710 94 225 -431 656 
2002 917 927 403 -249 -1425 1176 
2003 1755 1144 509 2649 1965 684 
2004 2845 2065 968 3388 2809 580 
2005 1304 941 183 1025 1131 -106 
2006 917 1111 514 453 318 135 
2007 1412 1612 380 -196 -328 131 
2008 -626 989 120 627 1118 -490 
BP Statistical review of world energy 2015 Thousands of barrels per day  
 
 
 
The Path of Differentials: LLS and Mars 
 
From 1999, the daily differential of LLS to WTI, averaged out over the year to a 
negligible amount - significantly narrower than a premium or discount of $1/bl, until 2006
64
. 
Large movements away from the US benchmark are contained to the very end of the trade 
month, which tends to be the most volatile time of the month. 
LLS had an average premium of $1.45/bl to WTI in 2006 and LLS was, on average, 
at a premium of $3.10/bl to WTI the following year. The rising premium of LLS to WTI 
provides at least minimal support that the WTI price increases through 2007 were at least 
somewhat justified by conditions in the physical market. The spot market price for LLS was 
slightly above the price established in the futures market. This lends some support to the idea 
that a speculative bubble was not pressuring the price beyond which the physical market 
could sustain. 
 
                                                 
64
 All LLS and Mars differentials from Argus Media daily LLS and Mars assessments 
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Figure 5.9 LLS Differential to WTI 2000-2005. Argus LLS differential midpoint daily value 
per barrel Argus Media 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 LLS Differential to WTI 2006-2008. Argus LLS differential weighted average 
daily value per barrel Argus Media 
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Examining the differential for Mars and the spread between Mars and LLS over the 
run up in the price of crude oil illustrates the relationship between different qualities of crude 
oil at the US Gulf coast.  
The differential for medium sour crude was weakening relative to the price of WTI 
and LLS over the run-up in prices. From 1999 through 2003, the average yearly differential 
for Mars ranged from a discount of $2.48/bl to $4.89/bl. The average yearly premium of LLS 
to Mars ranged from $2.30/bl to $4.85/bl. Similar to LLS, Mars tends to be erratic at the very 
end of the trade month. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Mars Differential to WTI 2000-2003. Daily Argus Mars differential midpoint 
daily value per barrel Argus Media 
 
 
 
From 2004 to 2008, the discount of Mars to WTI and to LLS moved to a new range, 
with the yearly average over the period between $5.57/bl and $7.07/bl under WTI and from 
$6.23/bl to $8.91/bl under LLS. The discount of Mars to WTI was the narrowest of the 
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period in 2007 - $5.57 - but the discount to LLS was one of the wider discounts of the period, 
at $8.67/bl. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Mars differential to WTI 2004-2008. Argus Mars differential midpoint daily 
value per barrel Argus Media 
 
 
 
That Mars weakened away from light sweet crudes from 2004 onwards supports the 
idea that light sweet crude was becoming more valuable or medium sour less so. From 2004, 
nearly all the increased production came from OPEC suppliers, many of which are associated 
with medium and heavy crude oil, as is the spare capacity held by Saudi Arabia. The average 
yearly Non-OPEC supply change was about 50,000 b/d from 2004 through 2008, and the 
average OPEC change was 1mn b/d, while the average change in consumption was 1.17mn 
b/d (BP). The timing also coincides with the introduction of more rigorous sulfur 
specifications in the US, which began in 2004. 
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The widening spread between the differential for LLS and for Mars, points to the 
legitimacy of the WTI price in physical markets, with both achieving larger differentials to 
WTI, but in opposite directions. The value of LLS at the coast was increasing as WTI was 
increasing in price, while the value of medium sour crude was falling relative to light sweet 
crude at the coast and in most years, relative to WTI as well.  
 
Figure 5.13 Desulfurization Capacity US Gulf Coast. PADD 3 US Gulf Coast 
Desulfurization Capacity annual data, barrels per day Energy Information Administration 
 
 
 
As WTI was rising in 2008, eventually peaking on 3 July 2008 at $145.29/bl, the 
price of LLS never fell below that for WTI. LLS did fall faster than WTI amid a credit 
crunch, following the September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse. Prior to WTI bottoming 
out at $33.87/bl on 19 December 2008, the differential for LLS reversed, returning to 
positive territory. As WTI fell farther below $50/bl, the premium for LLS increased, and the 
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discount for Mars to WTI narrowed, with Mars even moving to a premium to a falling WTI, 
temporarily, indicating the price in the futures market was likely lower than that justified by 
conditions in the physical market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 LLS and Mars Differential to WTI 2008. Argus Mars and Argus LLS daily 
differential weighted average, per barrel. Argus Media 
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Table 5.3 LLS differential to WTI 2000-2008 
Year Min Max Ave 
2000 -2.75 1.11 0.01 
2001 -1.50 1.38 -0.04 
2002 -1.75 1.11 0.13 
2003 -1.90 1.13 0.10 
2004 -1.05 2.16 0.06 
2005 -1.64 2.88 0.65 
2006 -0.75 6.76 1.45 
2007 -1.25 7.70 3.10 
2008 -1.38 8.10 2.78 
Argus LLS daily differential midpoint, per barrel. Argus Media (author calculation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Mars differential to WTI 2000-2008  
Year Min Max Ave 
2000 -7.90 0.06 -4.34 
2001 -9.25 -2.30 -4.89 
2002 -5.45 -1.31 -2.48 
2003 -7.70 -1.35 -3.60 
2004 -12.85 -3.06 -6.16 
2005 -8.39 -4.35 -6.16 
2006 -10.36 -3.00 -7.07 
2007 -14.34 0.54 -5.57 
2008 -10.25 1.36 -6.13 
Argus Mars daily differential midpoint per barrel. Argus Media (author calculation) 
 
 
 
The Path of Prices Post-2008 Crash 
 
Since the peak and subsequent crash in 2008, the WTI price recovered from the lows of the 
financial crisis and was moving within a steady range. During both the recovery of 2009 and 
the stability of 2010, the average LLS differential returned to a range of more than $2.50/bl 
but less than $3.50/bl, while Mars averaged a discount of less than $1.50/bl. Beginning in 
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2009, the WTI price would periodically recede from other crude oil prices as stocks in 
Cushing surged. When WTI moved to a large discount to the rest of the world, differentials at 
the US Gulf coast moved above WTI to compensate. 
Even if rising prices, beginning 2003 and continuing into 2008, were not entirely 
justified by conditions in the physical market, higher prices solicited a response from 
participants in the oil industry and non-OPEC oil supplies began growing once again. The 
higher prices justified higher cost production areas, both conventional and unconventional. 
The increase in production resulted directly from higher price levels.   
Horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing and ultra-deep offshore drilling in the Gulf of 
Mexico
65
 reversed the downtrend in US oil production
66
, which had been on the declining 
since the mid-1980s. Projects or unconventional methods once considered too expensive 
were profitable at the higher price levels. Unconventional sources of oil or methods of 
production include ‘shale’ production, or properly, light tight oil (LTO) and heavy bitumen, 
or tar sands, typical in the US and Canada, respectively, were uneconomical until the oil 
price spike of the early twentieth century. Production costs have since declined as 
unconventional production became routine.  
The largest gains in oil production from unconventional methods came from the 
Eagle Ford, Permian and Bakken production areas. The Eagle Ford formation is in south 
Texas, the Permian formation is in west Texas and North Dakota is home to the Bakken 
                                                 
65
 Offshore production growth was stalled by the historical BP oil leak in April 2010. 
Offshore oil production also has a longer lag between actual output and the decision to take 
on a specific project, making it less responsive in the short and medium term to oil prices. 
66
 While overall US production was falling, production in the Gulf of Mexico continued to 
grow into the early 2000s. 
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formation. Shale or LTO, tends to be a higher quality oil, with higher API gravity and low 
levels of sulfur
67
. 
An increased level of domestic and Canadian production and an inability to adapt 
infrastructure as quickly as new production centers arose led to a deep discount between the 
US benchmark, which represents the cost of light sweet at Cushing, Oklahoma, and the cost 
of crude oil in the rest of the world. Inland areas of the US had larger supplies than 
infrastructure could handle, leading to a lower price. 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Bakken Oil Production. Bakken oil production estimate barrels  
per day Drilling Productivity Report Energy Information Administration 
 
                                                 
67
 Canadian oil sands are very heavy crude oil that is typically high in sulfur and can also 
have higher acids and metals content. 
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Figure 5.16 Eagle Ford Oil Production. Eagle Ford oil production estimate barrels 
per day Drilling Productivity Report Energy Information Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Permian Oil Production. Permian oil production estimate barrels per  
day Drilling Productivity Report Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 5.18 US Oil Production. US oil production thousands of barrels per day  
Energy Information Administration 
 
 
Much of the Canadian, Bakken and other LTO production was routed to Cushing, 
Oklahoma, as it is a storage and pipeline hub. However, there were significantly large 
volumes of crude oil unable to move out of Cushing as fast as new production was arriving.  
Owing to the physical context at the pricing point for WTI, the price of WTI in the 
futures market moved well below the price of oil in the rest of the world, most importantly, 
the Brent benchmark. The delivery point for WTI was oversupplied with oil and the price in 
the futures market reflected this situation. 
The divergent conditions at Cushing from the rest of the world, including the US 
coasts eventually caused the Brent or North Sea market to take the title of international 
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the United States, where supplies were growing. WTI fell below the Brent benchmark, by 
over $20.00/bl at times, because supply was trapped in Cushing, OK.  
Pipelines were set up to deliver imports and production from the Gulf of Mexico 
inland, with several pipelines destined for the Cushing, Oklahoma hub
68
. Midcontinent 
refiners were connected to the Cushing hub, from where they would get their needed 
volumes. The larger volumes of inland and Canadian production could not be piped to the 
refining and storage centers along the US Gulf coast. Eventually inland production and 
western Canadian production delivered to Cushing oversupplied the hub and the 
midcontinent generally.  
Because the supply was stuck in the midcontinent, differentials at the coast 
immediately grew in magnitude, reflecting the fact that the benchmark at Cushing failed to 
represent the value of oil at the coast. The average differential for LLS reflected a very 
different context, relative to that at Cushing, Oklahoma, at an average premium of more than 
$17/bl in 2011 and 2012. Mars was representing divergent conditions as well, with average 
yearly premiums at $12/bl to WTI over the same period. In 2013, the premiums were 
narrower, with LLS averaging $9.35/bl over WTI while Mars was average $4.25/bl to WTI 
over the year. 
Pipeline owners expanded Cushing storage, reversed existing and built additional 
pipelines to carry excess crude oil supplies out of the midcontinent and to the Gulf Coast, but 
                                                 
68
 When US production was falling through the 1980s and 1990s, domestic onshore 
production became too small to feed both midcontinent and US Gulf coast refiners, leading 
industry participants to reverse pipelines. Lines began to carry imports from the Gulf to the 
middle of the country instead of delivering domestic onshore production to the Gulf coast 
refiners. 
143 
 
building adequate infrastructure took several years. Following greater connectivity from the 
WTI pricing point to the US Gulf coast, the size of the discount of WTI to ICE Brent 
decreased. However, until very recently, WTI remained at a discount to ICE Brent, given the 
higher level of domestic crude production in the US and a ban on domestic crude exports. 
For most of 2014-2015 WTI was within a $5/bl discount to Ice Brent. WTI moved to a 
premium to Ice Brent in December 2015 as the US repealed the ban on domestic crude 
exports
69
. By early 2016, WTI moved back to a small discount to the international 
benchmark, which spurred an increase in exports and tamed surging imports. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19 LLS Differential to WTI and ICE Brent less NYMEX WTI. Argus LLS weighted 
average differential and ICE Brent and NYMEX WTI month 1 daily settlement prices per 
barrel Argus Media and Energy Information Administration 
 
                                                 
69
 The motivation behind the repeal was narrowing the gap between the US benchmark and 
international prices, although as WTI moved above international prices, fewer exports were 
less likely and imports began to increase. 
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Adjustments to Pricing Imports to the US 
Just as physical infrastructure responded to the WTI futures price, producers 
exporting to the US market changed their pricing formulas as well. The change in pricing 
formulas can sometimes also happen with a lag, depending on the contract language and 
length of time covered. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq replaced WTI as their reference price, owing to the 
deep discount of WTI to the international marker in 2010. The OPEC producers adopted the 
Argus Sour Crude index (ASCI™) to which they set differentials for their crude oil sales to 
the US.  
The new ‘benchmark’ price better represents the price of crude oil at the point of 
import – the US coasts – as opposed to Cushing, Oklahoma70. ASCI™ is a volume-weighted 
average of trade for medium sour offshore crude oils, specifically, Mars, Poseidon and 
Southern Green Canyon (SGC). Mars is delivered to Clovelly, Louisiana, Poseidon is priced 
at Houma, Louisiana and SGC comes ashore and is priced at both Nederland, Texas and 
Texas City, Texas. Differentials for SGC and Poseidon are determined in the same manner as 
those for Mars and LLS – via spot transactions. 
WTI is the reference price of all of the crude oil streams that make up the index. The 
differential of medium sours at the US Gulf coast compensates for divergent conditions at 
Cushing, Oklahoma, the WTI marker, and the conditions at the coast. The OPEC producers 
set an official selling price for sales into the US, which comes in the form of a differential to 
the ASCI™ price. In setting a differential to the value of ASCI™, OPEC producers maintain 
                                                 
70
 Argus refers to these differentials, to which other crude oil is priced as “secondary 
benchmarks” (Argus LLS White Paper). 
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further discretion, and it is through changes in this differential that producers can increase or 
decrease their market share over time.  
Domestic medium sour crude oil cannot compete via price with imports from Saudi 
Arabia. If sellers in the domestic market agree to sell Poseidon, Mars or SGC at a deep 
discount to WTI, the price of crude oil from Saudi Arabia will follow the domestic price via a 
falling value of the ASCI index. If non-ASCI medium sour crude falls in price at the US Gulf 
coast it is likely that price weakness will spill over onto the value of Mars, Poseidon and/or 
SGC, thereby pressuring the ASCI index weaker. 
 
Rising US production changes global market 
 
Despite a ban on US crude exports, existing from the 1970s through to late 2015, US 
production ultimately helped usher in the current era of oversupply. As US production 
continued, the US market required fewer crude imports. Imports of crude oil to the US 
peaked at just over 10mn b/d, using annual EIA data. From 2004 through 2007, crude 
imports were over 10mn b/d (EIA US imports of crude oil, annual, b/d). Imports have fallen 
every year since 2010 with the largest annual decline occurring in 2013, when imports fell to 
7.7mn b/d from 8.5mn b/d in 2012. The average of monthly import data for 2015 is 7.3mn 
b/d. Crude imports to the US fell by an average of 467,000 b/d each year from 201 through 
2014. An additional change, not captured in aggregate imports, is the change in the 
composition of US imports. As Canadian production increased, imports of Canadian volumes 
to the US grew, changing mix of imports to the US, and causing additional producers to find 
new buyers. Increasing Canadian imports (see figure 5.21) and overall declining levels of 
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imports to the US equates to nearly 3mn b/d of international production that has been 
replaced by US refiners. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20 US Crude Oil Imports 1985-2014. Crude oil imports to the US 
thousands of barrels per day Annual average Energy Information Administration 
 
 
 
By 2014 the excess global supply of crude oil was more than apparent and prices 
began to drop in response, near the end of the US gasoline season, after peaking at 
$107.26/bl in June 2014
71
. Prices were nearing $75/bl as market participants awaited the 
outcome of the OPEC decision after their November 2014 meeting. 
 
 
                                                 
71
 All NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent price are daily settle prices pulled from the EIA. 
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Figure 5.21 Canadian Crude Oil Imports to the US 1985-2014. Canadian 
imports to the US thousands of barrels per day Annual data Energy Information 
Administration 
 
 
At the meeting, Saudi Arabia declared their intention to maintain their market share, 
rather than engage in the structurally changed market as a swing producer. Following the 
OPEC announcement not to reduce production levels, the price of oil resumed falling, until it 
bottomed out in the mid $40s in early 2015. The price then quickly recovered to $60/bl to 
$65/bl for some time, induced higher by the growing contango in the market.  
As the supply overhang continued and storage volumes increased, by the end of 2015 
prices had slipped once again to the upper $30s and early 2016 saw prices fall into the 
$20s/bl, as Europe lifted Iranian sanctions and fears over global growth increased. Overall 
production has been slow to respond to the lower price level, also aiding in the move to lower 
prices.  
The recent change in the level of production is not a period of temporary oversupply, 
for instance, brought about by a recessionary-induced drop in demand. Rather, production 
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has increased via conventional and unconventional methods such as hydraulic fracturing, the 
use of horizontal and directional wells and mining for heavy Bitumen in Canada. The higher 
prices brought about a structural change in the market. If Saudi Arabia had continued to pull 
back production to make room for recent increases, an end-date, at which point they would 
regain their market share, was not in sight.  
Saudi Arabia faced a similar decision in the 1980s, and they eventually chose to fight 
for market share via netback pricing. At the time, they abandoned the pricing method they 
had supported previously – OPEC-administered pricing. Production in OECD countries 
responded to the lower price levels.  
Saudi Arabia is using the current pricing method to maintain their share of the 
market, by accommodating demand as the price falls lower, in part because of their decision 
to fight for market share. The current pricing method arose under a condition of oversupply 
and appears to be well-suited for dealing with the current situation. Several independent US 
producers have yet to respond in the way the market expected: slashing production. Overall 
US production is falling extremely slowly and some individual participants have increased 
production to attain higher revenues in a lower price environment. Independent producer that 
alone do not produce enough to move the market price are incentivized to increase 
production when the market price falls in an attempt to maintain revenue. 
Prices had stabilized in the $60/bl range in 2014 under the assumption that US shale 
production was too expensive to continue production at that low price level. However, the 
costs of production have fallen as service companies reduce prices, the most productive areas 
become the only areas of expansion and attempts at efficiency gains begin. Moreover, since 
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some producers hedge in the financial markets, they were obtaining far greater revenue than 
sales of physical oil provide. Some producers locked in higher prices in the futures market 
before the price collapse and during the recovery in the $60s/bl. So far, shale production has 
yet to respond the way the market anticipated, leading prices to drop well below the $60/bl 
range. 
In every OPEC meeting since November 2014, Saudi Arabia has reiterated the plan to 
defend market share rather than price. As the low cost producer, they are unwilling to lose 
market share to high-cost production areas over the long term by supporting an artificially 
high price.  
While production will respond over time, it is possible every sustained price recovery 
leads to a jump in production thereby destroying the recovery that made growing production 
possible. Moreover, significant volumes currently sit in storage, and this storage will likely 
make it to the market when prices rise.  
Light tight oil production can be ‘turned’ off and on more quickly and easily than 
traditional deposits of oil. Since the oil is trapped in rock, the production can be quickly 
brought online as soon as the rock is fractured, as long as a well has already been drilled
72
. 
Additionally, light tight oil has decline rates that are significantly faster than traditional oil 
wells, meaning if producers do not continue to drill more wells, production declines faster 
than in traditional fields.  
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 Relative to traditional production in the US 
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Figure 5.22 Change in Oil Supply and change in Oil Product Consumption. World oil supply 
and world oil production consumption thousands of barrels per day. BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2015 
 
 
 
The activities futures markets participants necessarily influence the price of physical 
oil. However, feedback exists between the two realms, and many, if not most, oil companies 
operate in both the financial and physical markets for oil. Regardless of the cause of the 
behavior of the run-up in the price of oil futures contracts, the connections between the 
futures market and the physical market leads participants in the physical oil market to 
respond to prices determined in oil futures markets. 
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Figure 5.23 NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent Jan 2012 – March 2016. NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent month 1 contract daily  
settlement price per barrel 
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Figure 5.24 NYMEX WTI Open Interest 2005-2015. Total open interest in NYMEX Light Sweet Futures contract one-thousand barrel 
contracts weekly data Commitment of Traders  (COT) CFTC 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
An accounting of the structure, details and development of the oil pricing method 
illuminates some limits to the activities of purely financial participants on the price of oil in 
physical markets. An examination of the relationship between the basis and the differential at 
the US Gulf coast illustrates the constraints of the speculative group of players by 
emphasizing the role of oil market conditions on the outright price of oil as well as the 
involvement of physical market participants in the pricing of crude oil. Lastly, the method of 
crude oil pricing encourages a uniform price via cointegrated reference prices.  
The constraints to financial investor-activity on the physical price of oil are four-fold. 
First: the futures market relates to a specific physical market, which influences the futures 
price. Second: the exchange of physical oil nearly always entails at least one differential to 
the reference price, possibly including a value the producer determines. Third: industry 
participants change the physical market in response to both prices determined in the futures 
market and differentials. Lastly and most importantly, industry participants put the method in 
place and they continue to make adjustments as they see fit, including adopting financial 
markets in the pricing process and supporting electronic trading, thereby opening up financial 
markets beyond the traditional ‘speculators’ on a trading floor. 
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The first constraint arises from the connections between the futures market and the 
specific physical oil market related to a particular financial market. The Ice Brent contract 
price is determined via forward trade for cargoes and partial cargoes of physical North Sea 
oil, while the NYMEX Light Sweet contract relates the futures price to the physical light 
sweet market at the storage and pipeline hub, Cushing, Oklahoma. The deliverability of the 
NYMEX contract ensures that the price of light sweet crude at Cushing, Oklahoma is 
identical to the price in the futures market.   
The influence of the physical oil market at the benchmark location becomes clearest 
in the most extreme of circumstances, for example when the WTI benchmark moved below 
other world market prices as physical oil saturated the middle part of the US. The price 
accurately represented the price of physical oil at Cushing, Oklahoma. However, reference 
prices move together, as many others have shown, and in that sense, WTI as a reference price 
‘failed’.  
The strong connection between the futures market and the physical oil market at 
Cushing, Oklahoma was the direct cause of what has been labeled the “disconnect” of WTI 
from prices in the rest of the world.  WTI, despite being a reference price with a large 
financial market, remains receptive to physical market conditions in Cushing, Oklahoma. The 
physical market context at the location attached to the futures contract constrained the price 
of the futures contract. 
While the futures market and financial flows absorbed therein, forms a part of the 
price of the great majority of physical crude oil sold across the globe, a physical oil market at 
the delivery location of the futures contract grounds the futures price. Moreover, if the 
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physical market price diverges from the price in the futures market, physical market 
participants are likely to respond. Given that physical oil market participants are active in 
financial oil markets, a discrepancy in the two should close as physical market participants 
move between financial and physical trade. 
Spreads between reference markets also encourages physical movements. Following 
the removal of the US ban on US crude oil exports, NYMEX WTI went to a premium to ICE 
Brent, causing a surge in foreign imports, since imports were advantageous to domestic 
supplies, as foreign crude uses ICE Brent as a reference. US imports and commercial stocks 
of crude oil surged in December 2015 and WTI moved back to a discount to ICE Brent 
shortly thereafter. 
Differentials provide both price signals and flexibility to the reference price system. 
Part of this flexibility insulates physical oil markets from a potentially unrepresentative 
reference (or futures) price. Differentials respond to local market conditions, including 
adjusting away from an unrepresentative reference price, as happened at the US Gulf coast 
beginning in 2009.  
Large moves in differentials can be in either direction, as crude oil throughout the 
midcontinent that lacked infrastructure to move to the coast or to Cushing, was discounted 
heavily, even to a relatively low WTI price. These large discounts spurred the return of 
transporting crude oil by rail and increased the amount of crude oil transported and distance 
traveled by truck. Following the construction of sufficient pipeline capacity for the formerly 
stranded production, the higher cost of rail and trucking were no longer captured in what 
became a smaller differential. 
156 
 
Differentials behaved precisely as they should when the benchmark price does not 
represent the context of a specific physical oil market in another location. The increase in the 
magnitude of differentials and the responses of market participants to this change, further 
illustrates the influence of the physical market conditions on the price of oil.  
Producers and other industry participants responded to changes in both futures market 
and pricing differentials to adapt to a changing physical market. Growing production in the 
US resulted from the action of industry participants responding to the higher prices of the 
previous decade. Market participants built out infrastructure following the surge in 
production, which the price of WTI and differentials illuminated as an issue.  
OPEC members maintained the current pricing method, but adjusted the reference 
price for imports to the US, in response to an unrepresentative basis price. However, in 
adopting the ASCI price, Saudi Arabia did not abandon the WTI reference price, but rather 
added an adjustment value to it. In using ASCI, rather than raising producer-determined 
differentials, they did not have to predict the values that would arise in the spot market. Had 
they instituted large premiums, it would have been difficult to keep premiums competitive. 
Additionally, with Mars averaging $12/bl over WTI, the size of the producer-determined 
premium may have drawn unwanted attention. 
Market participants chose to adopt the NYMEX futures prices as the reference price 
in US contract markets. Prior to Koch cancelling their posting in 2006, the posting was 
already set it in line with the NYMEX CMA. Once the posting was cancelled, market 
participants moved to the NYMEX CMA pricing reference. The Phillips66 posting is a 
somewhat common price used to exchange physical WTI and other types of crude oil. The 
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Phillips 66 posting is $3.38/bl under the NYMEX CMA. Some Postings contracts use a 
combination of posted price and spot market trade to determine the postings plus.   
Spot markets had originally existed alongside contract market owing to the rise of 
independents, national oil companies, tax-spinning and declining integration among 
vertically integrated oil companies (Fattouh 2011; Mabro (Ed.) 1986; Mabro (Ed.) 2005 
Chapter 3 Fattouh, 52). Price competition between spot and contract markets arises 
periodically during periods of perceived or feared shortage or during periods containing 
excess supply (Ibid). Spot-market determined contract prices reduce price competition 
between the two types of markets, while using a common reference price assures greater 
price uniformity. 
Since differentials in spot markets set the price in contract markets, participants are 
privy to prices in spot markets and can match any discounts arising from sellers of non-WTI 
grades. Smaller producers cannot compete for market share via price because the transparent 
nature of spot markets illuminates price cuts, nearly immediately. 
Exchanges of WTI alongside Mars, LLS and other grades in the spot market, 
eliminate the ability of independents to ‘dump' production in the price-setting spot market. In 
the domestic US markets, independents remain a significant influence. If independent 
producers bring down the price of WTI in an attempt to compete for market share via price 
discounts, market participants immediately match discounts simply by using the WTI price 
as a reference price.  
The ‘financialization’ of oil occurred through historical time within a given context, 
including both the opening up of commodity markets and the legal changes required for 
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unsophisticated investors to buy commodity futures. Moreover, the financialization of oil 
pricing, i.e., using futures prices in the pricing of oil, was a deliberate choice, made by 
producers and other vested interests within the oil industry. Financial investors, using 
technical trading techniques, fundamental data, dollar-hedging or any other variable to trade 
oil futures cannot alone dictate the price of physical oil. Physical market responses to the 
price of oil determined in the futures market. 
When viewed through the lens of the current pricing method, crude oil markets begin 
to look much more like those of manufacturing, where agents within the market erect and 
maintain institutions that impute structure to a market thereby reducing price instability as 
well as uncertainty.  
That benchmark prices were cointegrated was one of the few points of consensus 
emerging from the empirical literature related to the oil speculation debate. The international 
oil market is then highly connected via the reference prices of oil, resulting in some 
semblance of price uniformity. The use of spot market differentials in contract prices also 
aids in market-price uniformity among contract sellers and between spot and contract sellers. 
Further research on the similarities and differences between the method of pricing 
commodities and that for pricing manufacturing goods is overdue. Commodities are distinct 
from manufacturing markets, as the price is constantly changing and sellers of the same type 
of crude oil are selling a nearly identical product. However, similar to the activities of 
manufacturing companies, market participants have put mechanisms and structures in place 
to help stabilize the market by encouraging uniform prices and minimizing excessive price 
competition. 
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This dissertation has only touched on the subject of commodity pricing, as it related 
solely to oil. Other commodities are likely to have similar methods of pricing, with some 
distinct differences. Further research is required on the similarities and differences in the 
methods of pricing a variety of other commodities, through an historical perspective, where 
industry participants establish and adjust market institutions, including those related to 
pricing. 
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